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THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED 
INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
BY; HSIUNG HUANG
MAJOR PROFESSOR: THOMAS J. WILBANKS, Ph.D.
The principal objective of this study is to estimate: (1) the 
regional patterns of benefits of the proposed Family Assistance Plan 
in the United States; and (2) the impact of the Family Assistance Plan 
on inter-state and intra-state income inequalities in the United States. 
Secondary objectives of this study include a review of the impacts of 
various income maintenance programs, including the Family Assistance 
Plan, and an investigation of additional dimensions of these impacts on 
regional labor supply, regional consumption, regional migration, regional 
demographic characteristics, and regional economic growth in the United 
States.
The results indicate that at the first glance the plan would benefit 
those more populous states than it would for other states. On a per capi­
ta basis, however, the higher levels of benefit would go to Southern and 
border states. The political support for the plan both in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate indicates a very significant inverse 
relationship between states' per capita program benefits and their politi­
cal support for the plan in Congress.
The analysis of income inequalities in the United States reveals that 
the present welfare system has caused a slight increase in inequalities 
between states. At the intra-state level, it has the effect of slightly 
reducing inequalities in some states while slightly increasing or making 
no difference in other states. The proposed Family Assistance Plan and a 
version of it adjusted for cost-of-living differences between states would 
mildly reduce inequalities both at the inter-state and intra-state levels. 
Their effectiveness in reducing within-state inequalities varies among 
states, with a strong inverse relationship between the Family Assistance 
Plan's effectiveness in reducing inequalities and the degree of affluence 
of individual states. The inclusion of geographical location, urban- 
rural character, and economic structure variables in the analysis of 
intra-state income inequalities indicates important relationships between 
the effectiveness of the Family Assistance Plan in reducing inequalities 
and these variables.
Current empirical research on income maintenance programs suggests 
that these programs would have effects, ranging from mild to insignificant, 
on regional labor supply, regional consumption, regional migration, and 
regional demographic characteristics. These effects might have different 
spatial repercussions with poor regions being affected at a much greater 
magnitude. Based on theoretical inferences, in the long-run income 
maintenance programs would stimulate economic growth in the poor regions 
not necessarily at the expense of the rich regions.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Objectives of the Study 
The principal objective of this study is to estimate: (1) the 
regional patterns of benefits of the proposed Family Assistance Plan 
in the United States; and (2) the impact of the Family Assistance 
Plan on inter-state and intra-state income inequalities in the United 
States.
Secondary objectives of this study include a review of the 
impacts of various income maintenance programs, including the Family 
Assistance Plan, and an investigation of additional dimensions of 
these impacts on regional labor supply, regional consumption, regional 
migration, regional demographic characteristics, and regional economic 
growth in the United States.
Justification of the Study 
It has been noted that the regional impact of many public policies 
and programs, such as those of the federal government, has been varied 
and unequal with respect to the affected areas (Vaughan, 1977). Even 
though they were designed in such a way that regional discrepancies in 
program benefits, or effects, could be avoided or minimized, the nature 
and magnitude of such variations, was not clear or fully understood by 
many elected representatives at the times those programs were under 
consideration. Owing to this misunderstanding or misinterpretation 
by the elected representatives, many sound public programs failed
1
to obtain enough support for enactment and implementation, while 
many other less effective ones were enacted and implemented. This 
fact suggests that geographic distribution of program benefits (or 
potential benefits) does not necessarily match the geographic 
distribution of political support for the programs (Wilbanks and 
Huang, 1975).
Still, much of the effect of the federal government on regional 
development is inadvertent. Schultz (1972: 1) points out that 
overriding interests dictate the timing and direction of change in 
public policy which often have substantial regional repercussions.
Many federal policies or programs were found to have irreversible 
effects on the regional or local economic growth or development. A 
good example of this nature is provided by the federal interstate 
highway construction program. This project has increased and 
improved the accessibility of many lagging or slow-growing regions 
in the United States. A consequence of this improvement in accessibility 
is the opening-up of these regions to the outside industries, businesses, 
and people at the expense of those more developed and congested regions.
A steady out-migration of industries, businesses, and people from the 
Northeast and Midwest to the South and West has stimulated and promoted 
considerable economic growth in the South and West at the expense of 
the Northeast and Midwest.
The improved highway systems, the increased use of private 
automobiles, and the availability of truck transportation have 
significantly altered the urban structure, land use, and urban growth 
patterns in favor of the suburban areas and at the expense of the 
central cities. These effects are not reversible, because highways
cannot easily be torn up. Consequently, other federal programs had to 
be initiated to assist those regions or areas that have suffered from 
the inadvertent effects of the interstate highway program. Many of 
these assistance programs, such as the ufban renewal programs, are 
proven to be of little help to those adversely affected regions or 
areas.
There are other federal policies or programs with effects that 
can be reversed with varying degrees of success and ease. It is in 
this area that much of the research in the regional impacts, direct 
or indirect, of federal policies and programs has been concentrated. 
These studies have covered different effects of various types of 
federal policies and programs, such as the economic and political 
impact of general revenue sharing (Juster, 1976), the distributional 
impact of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (Neenan,
1976), economic effects of tax-transfer policy (Haveman, 1976), AFDC 
tax rates and state reactions (Hutchens, 1976), and the urban and 
regional impacts of federal policies (Vaughan, 1977). Studies of 
this type attempt to identify the potential impacts of federal 
policies or programs on regions or areas so that the "degree of 
freedom" available to the federal government can be determined and 
utilized in the design and development of various federal regional, 
urban, and rural policies or programs (Vaughan, 1977: ix).
Thus, the regional consequences of major federal policies and 
programs should be appraised by those who are engaged in the planning 
and coordination of development policies for different regions of a 
national entity. An important piece of pending legislation of this 
nature is the federal Family Assistance Plan (FAP).
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The Family Assistance Plan is essentially an income maintenance 
program proposed to replace some of the present welfare programs which 
are considered ill-designed. There has been a general belief that the 
present welfare system in the United States has failed to perform those 
functions it is supposed to do. But, there is hardly any consensus on 
what should replace it. DaVanzo and Greenberg (1974) believe that this 
lack of agreement is probably caused by the uncertainty over the ultimate 
cost of proposed alternatives to the present welfare system and the 
extent to which these alternatives might alter existing behavioral 
patterns of those who participate. At the subnational level, the 
range of uncertainty is even greater. These alternatives would involve 
various proposals for state and local welfare budgets, the effects of 
these proposals on the geographic allocation of federal transfer 
payments to the poor, and the proposals’ differential regional impacts 
on various dimensions of human behavior.
The debate and study of various income maintenance programs went 
back only to the early 1960's in the United States (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1967). Since then, many studies have been conducted to 
examine the potential impacts of those income maintenance programs.
Among them, however, empirical attempts to estimate the nature and 
magnitude of effects associated with income maintenance programs are 
still at a rather preliminary stage with respect to producing reliable 
information to policy-makers, and most of those efforts have focused 
mainly on national effects (DaVanzo and Greenberg, 1974: 24).
The present study is, therefore, intended to identify and analyze 
some of the potential impacts of an income maintenance program, the 
Family Assistance Plan, at the subnational level. A better
understanding of the potential impacts and effectiveness of the Family 
Assistance Plan would provide policy-makers with some useful information 
for their future actions on welfare reform measures in this country.
A  study of this nature apparently involves many disciplines, 
such as economics, sociology, political science, psychology, demography, 
and many others. Then, a question arises concerning the justification 
of doing something like this by a geographer. As a geographer, we 
shall be concerned with any existing (or potential) spatial incongruities, 
as suggested by Abler, Adams, and Gould (1971), and with means to help 
rectify such spatial incongruities (Wohlenberg, 1976a; and Johnston,
1977). The variations in regional impacts of any federal, or national, 
legislation provide an example of such spatial incongruities. The 
potential spatial incongruities caused by any federal program can 
have a profound influence on the existing spatial incongruities caused 
by other processes (such as economic development). The spatial 
variations in the program effects of the Family Assistance Plan will 
determine its effectiveness in reducing existing spatial inequalities 
(as measured by differences in per capita personal income) in the 
United States.
As an economic geographer, we shall be concerned with any program- 
induced impacts on regional economic growth or development. Although 
the Family Assistance Plan is an income maintenance program designed 
to reduce the inequality in welfare payments among the general 
populace, it may very well have some direct and indirect effects on 
the economic growth or development process. The causal relationship 
between economic development and spatial inequality is, however, 
still an uncertain and much debated one. The classical hypothesis
advanced by Simon Kuznets (1955) assumes that the secular behavior 
of inequality follows an inverted U-shaped pattern with inequality 
first increasing and then decreasing with economic development. This 
hypothesis has considered economic development as a causal factor in 
changes in spatial inequality.
Other economists, such as Albin (1970), Seers (1970), Chiswick 
(1971), and Higgins (1973), have adopted a more realistic view of 
the relationship between inequality and economic development. They 
believe that there are interactions between the two variables and 
that they are mutually reinforcing. The present study is examining 
such relationship along this line of thinking and believes that 
inequality will have some direct and indirect effects on the rate of 
regional economic growth or development.
The current literature on the relationship between inequality 
and economic development is contributed mainly by economists. Few 
geographers have paid much attention to this type of problem which 
has profound spatial implications. Sample and Griffin (1971),
Sample and Gauthier (1972), Schwind (1971), Lankford (1972), and 
Hodge and Lee (1976) are among the few geographers who have worked 
directly or indirectly on this problem. Logically, after the 
recognition and identification of various types of spatial inequalities, 
one would seek means to rectify these inequalities and increase the 
level of welfare among the general populace. Unfortunately, 
geographers are lagging behind scholars and practitioners in other 
disciplines in this area. In the study of poverty and welfare 
reforms, only a handful of geographers have contributed their 
expertise and efforts, among them Morrill and Wohlenberg (1971),
Smith (1973), Wohlenberg (1976a, 1976b, and 1976c), and Johnston 
(1977). The lack of attention from geographers on these important 
spatial issues provides another important incentive and justification 
for the present study of the Family Assistance Plan.
Recently, a major study of the economic impacts of the proposed 
Family Assistance Plan and a negative income tax (NIT) plan was 
attempted by Golladay and Haveman (1977). In their study, an 
empirical simulation model was designed to estimate the program 
benefits and taxation requirements of the two plans and their effects 
on the entire U.S. economy. This study yielded detailed estimates 
of the direct and indirect effects of the two income maintenance 
programs on consumption spending, outputs, employment, and income 
redistribution, both geographically and sectorally. However, their 
study only dealt with the economic aspect of the potential impacts 
of these income maintenance programs. Excluded in the model were 
many important issues, such as the recipients' behavioral responses 
to the income maintenance programs in their decisions to work, to 
migrate, or to alter family structure. And, due to the short-run, 
current-account, and non-recursive nature of the model, investment 
behavior induced by the income maintenance programs was not included 
in the model, nor was the second, third, and nth adjustments in the 
economy induced by these programs. The present study differs from 
the Golladay and Haveman (1977) study not only in objectives, but 
also in scope. Those important issues ignored by Golladay and 
Haveman (1977) will be dealt with directly or indirectly in the 
present study.
8
Scope of the Study 
The present study is mainly concerned with the impacts of the 
Family Assistance Plan, as was proposed by the Nixon Administration 
and passed by the House of Representatives, and its slightly modified 
version which adjusts payments to state living-cost index. Two other 
alternative plans, namely the Senate Finance Committee's version of 
the Family Assistance Plan and that of the Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 
are not included in the present study. The former is known as the 
"workfare" plan which makes it mandatory that welfare recipients 
able to work must do so or lose all of their Family benefits. The 
latter would set a guaranteed annual income of $2,600 ($2,400 in 
the House version) for a family of four with no outside income.
Their exclusion by the present study does not suggest their 
irrelevance and insignificance, but rather indicates serious data 
problems. The lack of data on the number of potential recipients 
of the Family Assistance Plan who would be physically and mentally 
fit to work causes formidable problems for its inclusion in the 
present study. The Ribicoff plan is almost identical to the House 
version, except for a $200 difference in payments for a family of 
four without outside income. This minor difference would not cause 
significant variations in program impacts between the two plans.
Thus, only the House version of the Family Assistance Plan and its 
living-cost-adjusted version will be dealt with in the present study.
The Family Assistance payments will be estimated for each county 
in the United States as of 1970 according to the program specifications 
and the number and average size of poor families within that county in 
1970. The state Family Assistance payments are sums of Family
Assistance payments received by all counties within that state in 
question. In order to compare the differences in program benefits 
between states, per capita Family Assistance payments will be 
calculated for each state. The same tasks will be performed for the 
modified version of the Family Assistance Plan. Since geographic 
distribution of program benefits does not necessarily coincide with 
geographic distribution of political support for the program, a 
comparison will be made between per capita Family Assistance payments 
for the 50 states and their support in Congress for the plan.
The impact of the Family Assistance Plan and its modified version 
on inter-state and intra-state income inequalities is measured as the 
degree of reduction in inequalities caused by the Family Assistance 
payments. Due to the limitations and incompleteness of the county 
data for the most recent years, only 1970 census data will be used 
to estimate the Family Assistance payments for each county. Thus, 
the study of impact of the plans on inter-state and intra-state 
income inequalities in the United States has to be based on 1970 
population and income data.
Also owing to the limited resources available to this study, a 
broad and comprehensive investigation of the impacts of the Family 
Assistance Plan on the entire economic and social life in the 
United States is unfeasible. The present study will only deal with 
the plan's possible impacts on regional labor supply, changes in 
regional consumption patterns, present and future patterns of 
regional migration of people, changes in present and future 
demographic characteristics between regions, and regional economic 
growth in the United States. The treatment of the plan's impacts
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on these issues in this study will be in the form of synthetic 
review of current research along these lines and a theoretical 
analysis of the additional dimensions of the plan’s impacts on 
these issues. This study will be carried out in a sequence as 
outlined by a general procedural scheme (Figure 1).
Chapter II discusses the origin and evolution of the concept 
of income maintenance. Various income maintenance programs, 
especially that of the United States, are briefly discussed here. 
Also included is a description of the major drawbacks of various 
existing income maintenance programs in the United States. The 
Family Assistance Plan is treated very generally in terms of its 
program specifications, legal backgrounds, and legislative status.
Chapter III discusses impacts of various income maintenance 
programs, including the Family Assistance Plan, on regional patterns 
of labor supply, consumption, and demographic characteristics in the 
United States.
Chapter IV describes the various methodologies used in this 
study. These methodologies are divided into two groups. The 
first group consists of techniques used to estimate the benefits 
of the Family Assistance Plan and the methods for estimating 
living-cost index for each of the 50 states in the United States.
The other group consists of three measures of income inequality, 
namely a Williamson coefficient of variation, an information 
statistic, and Gini index.
Chapter V discusses the chief findings and analysis of this 
study. These include: (1) the regional patterns of benefits of 
the Family Assistance Plan; (2) the regional patterns of political
FIGURE 1 
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support for the Family Assistance Plan; (3) the impact of the 
Family Assistance Plan on inter-state income inequalities in the 
United States; and (4) the impact of the Family Assistance Plan 
on intra-state income inequalities in the United States.
Chapter VI discusses effects of various income maintenance 
programs, including the Family Assistance Plan, on regional migration 
and regional economic growth in the United States. These effects 
would have some significant implications for regional economic 
development in the United States.
Chapter VII concludes this study with summary and suggestions 
of directions for the study of welfare system or future welfare 
reforms in the United States.
CHAPTER II
THEORIES AND PRACTICE OP INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
Origin and Evolution of the Concept 
of Income Maintenance
Income maintenance programs are one type of social security 
measure designed to provide alternative income to persons whose normal 
private incomes have temporarily or permanently disappeared or to remove 
from individuals and families the burden of some very generally experi­
enced charges on income (Burns, 1956; 4; and Heclo, 1974: 13).
Thus, by definition, income maintenance programs can be divided 
into two categories. The first includes programs such as public 
assistance or relief, compulsory social insurance, statutory payments 
and awards to certain categories of persons (such as veterans), income- 
conditioned pensions, and work relief programs. The second category, 
aimed at raising standards of li-ving, intends to socialize the costs 
of some items which are part of the normal consumption patterns, but 
are surely experienced differently by different families.^ Therefore, 
many governments have attempted to protect individuals, even though 
they enjoy normal incomes, from a reduction in their standard of living 
due to the costs of, for example, medical care by instituting health 
insurance systems or by providing medical care as a public service 
similar to public education. Also, most highly developed countries, 
except the United States, make payments to all families with children
^Subsidized housing and rent control are other examples of this 
type of income maintenance.
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regardless of income levels in the belief that the standard of living 
of the family declines as the number of its members increases (Bums, 
1956; 4; and Kahn, 1969: 219).
These income maintenance programs have typically taken two forms: 
cash payments and benefits in kind. In most countries, the former are 
more important today. The traditional social security system, the 
poor law, provided the poor only assistance in kind, or supported them 
in an institution. Since the turn of the century, outdoor relief (or 
assistance given in the home) has come to replace institutional relief, 
at least for able-bodied persons, while assistance in cash has generally 
taken the place of payments in kind. The policy of giving economic 
assistance in kind was adopted mainly for two reasons: (1) it was 
believed to be unpopular with the beneficiaries and would thus discourage 
recourse to publicly assured income; and (2) it was thought to be a means 
for meeting the basic needs of the economically insecure with minimum 
cost to the taxpayers, especially at a time when there was a general 
belief that those who sought public aid were usually persons incapable 
of efficiently managing their own economic affairs (Burns, 1956: 5).
The in-kind assistance may also reflect the lobbying strengths of 
various interest groups (such as the farmers) for their desire to 
increase the government’s purchase of certain goods, for example, food 
CBarth, Carcagno, and Palmer, 1974: 36).
Over the years, many began to recognize the ’’undesirable effects 
on human personality of this removal from the individual of all freedom 
in the running of his economic life and of the fact that this system 
is often administratively costly, especially for large numbers" (Burns, 
1956: 5). Also, in the western culture or economy, it is believed that
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a fully participating member should have control of a certain minimum 
of funds to negotiate in the market for the things he has to buy (Kahn, 
1969: 219). It was considerations like these, reinforced by wide­
spread resentment among the recipients, especially during the depression 
years when millions of normally independent workers were forced to 
seek public assistance, that induced both the virtual abandonment of 
many of these forms of assistance and the search for new ways to assure 
the unemployed of their income security through cash payments.
A broad comparison indicates a great deal of cross-national 
similarity in income maintenance programs (Heidenheimer, Heclo, and 
Adams, 1975: 188). Most developed countries have used the same 
basic program components: compensation for work injuries; social 
insurance for the aged, disabled and widowed; assistance in paying 
medical bills; benefits for the unemployed; and aid to parents of 
large families. Compensation for injuries at work has usually been 
among the first income maintenance programs. Pensions for the aged, 
widows, and invalids along with early forms of sickness and maternity 
benefits came next. National programs for the unemployed were to 
follow later in most nations, and cash payments to families with 
children— family allowances— have been fairly recent supplements.
Table 1 shows the year when the first program in each category was 
initiated in a number of countries.
Income Maintenance Programs 
in the United States
Present income maintenance programs in the United States 
originated in the Depression of the 1930s (Ozawa, 1977: 123), as 
millions of workers were unemployed. The design of these programs
16
TABLE 1













Denmark 1898 1891 1892 1907 1952
France 1898 1905 1928 1905 1932
Germany 1884 1889 1883 1927 1954
Greece 1914 1922 1926 1945 1958
Italy 1898 1923 1910 1919 1936
Netherlands 1901 1913 1913 1916 1939
Sweden 1901 1913 1910 1934 1947
United Kingdom 1897 1908 1911 1911 1945
United States 1908 1935 1965 1935 “ “
Source: Heidenheimer, Heclo, and Adams, 1975: 189.
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was based on the notion that in the society employable people should 
obtain their income through employment. When enough jobs (full 
employment) were available, adequate education would insure young 
people a place in the labor force when they left school. Families 
and individuals would need assistance only when there were drastic 
changes in the unemployment rate, and when there were crippling losses 
of income if the breadwinner retired, died, or became disabled. Public 
assistance would only serve as a "residual program" to help those 
considered unable to enter the labor force (President’s Commission on 
Income Maintenance Programs, 1969).
This very notion led to the creation of the Social Security system, 
which provided partial income replacement to workers and their families 
in the event of retirement or death. In more recent years it has 
extended the provision of incoiae to disabled workers and health insurance 
for the aged. State unemployment insurance programs were also created 
to keep those who were temporarily unemployed from becoming pauperized. 
The welfare system was built as an optional state program, jointly 
financed by all levels of government, to provide aid for particular 
categories of the needy: the blind, the aged, the disabled, and 
dependent children. Able-bodied male workers were generally excluded 
from assistance under any of the welfare programs (President's Commission 
on Income Maintenance Programs, 1969).
Today, there are more than 100 income maintenance programs in the 
United States (Lurie, 1975: 5). The social insurance programs account 
for the greatest share of both expenditures (Table 2) and recipients. 
These programs including Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health 
Insurance (OASDHI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) are aimed at
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TABLE 2










Social Insurance $ 85.9 $ 72.2 $ 13.7
Public Aid 28.3 17.8 10.5
Health and Medical 14.6 7.2 7.4
Veterans' Programs 13.0 12.9 0.1
Education 65.2 6.9 58.3
Housing and Other 
Social Welfare 8.2 5.2 3.0
Total 215.2 122.3 92.9
® Includes federal grants to state and local governments. 
^ Excludes federal grants to state and local governments. 
Source: Browning, 1975: 15.
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preventing individuals' or families' incomes from falling following 
events that are accompanied by a decrease in earning power. These 
risks include retirement, death of the breadwinner, injury or illness, 
and unemployment; and their coverage depends on prior attachment to 
the labor force. The other large category of programs includes those 
designed to raise the incomes of the poor, such as Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program, Medicaid, public housing, and Food Stamps (FS).
Benefits under these programs are based on current need, not on 
prior attachment to the labor force. The social insurance programs, 
with the exception of Medicare, provide assistance in the form of 
cash payments. Some of the need-based programs such as AFDC and SSI 
provide cash but many give in-klnd benefits in the form of food, medical 
care, or housing (Lurie, 1975: 5).
Although each program has its own specific objective and rules 
concerning eligibility, benefit schedules, and administrative procedures, 
the objectives of many of these programs are quite similar, especially 
those providing cash payments to raise the incomes of the poor. Thus, 
many believe that such a high degree of similarity between these 
programs would warrant a consolidation of them or a replacement by a 
single program. Substituting one new program for several existing 
programs with similar objectives would considerably reduce the 
administrative complexity and the administrative cost of the welfare 
system. Also, a properly designed comprehensive program or a set of 
programs could reduce or eliminate many of the other undesirable 
features of the income maintenance. These features include the adverse 
effects on behavioral incentives, such as the incentives to work, save.
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migrate, form families, and have children; the gaps and overlaps in 
coverage; the wide variation in benefits given to families with the 
same need; and other inequities and inefficiencies associated with 
various income maintenance programs (Lurie, 1975: 6).
How do these complex and overlapping programs affect the present 
welfare system? Is it true that the system as a whole would overcome 
the defects of individual programs? Browning (1975) argues that the 
combined effects of these various programs are often quite different 
from what would appear from an examination of the separate programs. 
And it is the defects, not the strengths, in the programs that are 
magnified by the interactions among them. Some examples of 
contradiction and anomalies of the present welfare system were 
provided by Browning (1975: 60-61):
(1) Job-training programs are supposed to augment the 
earning capacity of workers with limited skills. But 
it is quite possible that all the training provided 
by government does not offset the decline in on-the- 
job training produced as a result of the minimum wage 
law. Not only do those who are unemployed as a 
consequence of the law lose valuable experience and 
training, but also those who remain employed receive 
less training because it is not profitable for a firm 
to train unskilled workers if it cannot partially 
cover the costs by paying workers lower wages during 
the training period.
(2) Programs often interact to frustrate policy changes 
designed to help the poor. One might assume that an 
across-the-board increase in social security benefits 
would help the elderly poor. But for the elderly poor 
who are receiving SSI as well as social security,
an increase in social security benefits is, in most 
cases, of no benefits at all. Higher social security 
payments reduce SSI payments, dollar for dollar, so a 
$100 increase under the former reduces benefits by 
$100 under the latter. Moreover, an elderly person 
receiving medicaid benefits may find that an increase 
in social security benefits makes him ineligible for 
medicaid altogether.
(3) Agricultural price supports (until recently), along 
with tariffs and quotas on agricultural products, work 
to increase the prices paid for food at the same time 
that food stamps (and the other food programs for the 
poor) are used to reduce food costs. For many families
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the benefits of food stamps are more than offset by the 
added costs imposed by these other programs.
(4) Restrictive labor-union practices (sanctioned by law), 
provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act, and minimum wage laws 
increase housing costs while another group of programs 
attempts to reduce them. A great many poor families, 
especially those not covered by present housing subsidies, 
are worse off because of this combination of policies.
(5) In attempting to offset the work-disincentive effects 
of high marginal tax rates in AFDC, the government requires 
work registration of some mothers. Work requirements are 
notoriously ineffective in the best of circumstances,
but an unexpected reason for this ineffectiveness is 
afforded by the following example. Suppose the penalty 
for refusal to work is a reduction in the AFDC monthly 
payment from $168 to $119, or by $49. The reduction in 
AFDC benefits, however, reduces the price the family 
must pay for food stamps and public housing, so the net 
cost of work refusal (due to the increased subsidies 
under the other programs) falls from $49 to $24. If 
there are any expenses associated with work, it is easy 
to see why this work requirement would be totally 
ineffective.
Recent Welfare Reform Movement 
in the United States
Because of the serious drawbacks of the present welfare system, 
those concerned began to search for new alternatives to the present 
system (Worthington and Lynn, 1977). Many believe that a nationally 
administered program of guaranteed income would provide the best 
solution to the present welfare dilemma (Orr, 1976; 359). Three 
different proposals, namely full cash payment, negative income tax, 
and family allowance, have drawn most attention and debate.
The full cash payment program advocated by Robert Theobald (1965) 
has been considered by most observers as the most radical of all the 
income maintenance programs. He sees the way to eliminate poverty 
is to supply money rather than moral uplift, cultural refinements, 
extended education, retraining programs or makework jobs. He argues 
that a program of guaranteed income is needed because automation
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ultimately will reduce the availability of conventional jobs and
make necessary a substitute system of providing income unrelated to
work. Such a program, which he calls Basic Economic Security (BBS),
would establish an income floor for each individual. BBS would
provide each American with an income "sufficient to live with
dignity" and would eventually replace all existing income maintenance
plans such as welfare, minimum wage. Social Security and unemployment
compensation (Congressional Quarterly, 1967).
According to BBS, a $1,050-guarantee would be initially proposed
for every adult and $650 for each child or a total of $3,400 for a
family of four. There would be annual recalculations of these
amounts. And, the recipients would not be required to work. Under
this plan, a family of four without income would receive a full
government allowance of $3,400, If it had an income of $2,000, it
would get $1,400 in government payments and another $200 as a 10-
percent premium for having earned $2,000 on its own. When a family’s
incomes exceed $3,400, it would not be eligible for any government
payments (Congressional Quarterly, 1967),
The negative income tax program was proposed by Milton Friedman
(1962), He proposed it as a substitute for present welfare programs,
as a device for accomplishing the objectives of those programs more
efficiently, at lower cost to the taxpayers and with a sharp reduction
in bureaucracy. The Friedman plan differs from the Theobald plan or
other versions of the guaranteed income in that it encourages those
with low incomes to work. As explained by Friedman (1962; 192):
We now have an exemption of $600 per person under the 
federal income tax (plus a minimum 10 percent flat deduction), 
If an individual receives $100 taxable income, i.e., an income 
of $100 in excess of the exemption and deductions, he pays a
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tax. Under the proposal, if his taxable income minus $100, 
i.e., $100 less than the exemption plus deductions, he would 
pay a negative tax, i.e., receive a subsidy. If the rate of
subsidy were, say, 50 per cent, he would receive $50. If
he had no income at all, and, for simplicity, no deductions, 
and the rate were constant, he would receive $300. He might
receive more than this if he had deductions, for example,
for medical expenses, so that his income less deductions, 
was negative even before subtracting the exemption. The 
rates of subsidy could, of course, be graduated just as 
the rates of tax above the exemption are. In this way, 
it would be possible to set a floor below which no man’s 
net income (defined now to include the subsidy) could 
fall— in the simple example $300 per person. The precise 
floor set would depend on what the community could afford.
Friedman (1962) set up 50 per cent as the highest possible rate of
subsidy. Any rate above 50 percent would reduce or eliminate (as in
the case of 100 percent rate favored by Theobald) recipients’ incentives
to earn any income.
A more generous version of the Friedman negative tax scheme was 
proposed by James Tobin. Under the Tobin plan, the ceiling level at 
which all government supplements would stop could be as high as $7,500 
with an absolute guaranteed floor of $2,500, This plan could cost 
between $14 and $25 billion a year compared to Friedman’s $7 to $9 
billion program (Congressional Quarterly, 1967).
Another major guaranteed income program is the so called ’Family 
Allowance’ advanced mostly by Alvin Schorr and Daniel P. Moynihan.
Under Schorr plan, a monthly payment of $50 would be paid for each 
child under six years old and $10 a month for each older child, in 
rich and poor families alike. Present income tax exemptions for 
children would be eliminated and the allowance itself would be taxed. 
Schorr argued that such a plan would be simpler to administer, more 
equitable and had the added benefit of being essentially an income- 
by-right program. He claimed that such a program would take three
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out of four children out of poverty without interfering with work 
incentives for the family and without having effects on its birth 
rate. He estimated the cost of the program would be at about $12 
billion annually and would be financed by general revenue. Moynihan’s 
version of family allowance program would cost less, about $9 billion 
annually (Congressional Quarterly, 1967).
The controversial concept of a government-guaranteed minimum 
income for all Americans drew more interest in 1967 when President 
Johnson decided to appoint a commission to study the issue. President 
Johnson said "Their advocates include some of the sturdiest defenders 
of free enterprise. These plans may or may not prove to be practicable 
at any time. But we must examine any plan, however unconventional, 
which could produce a major advance," (Congressional Quarterly, 1967). 
The Commission on Income Maintenance was finally appointed in January 
1968. After 22 months’ intensive study of the problem, the Commission 
had recommended an income maintenance program similar to that of 
Friedman. The Commission proposed that the program be initiated at a 
level providing a base income of $2,400 to a family of four. The basic 
payment would be reduced by 50 cents for each dollar of income from 
other sources. Families of four with outside income up to $4,800 thus 
would receive some supplementation. The Commission argued that the 
50 percent tax rate would encourage recipients to continue working or 
to seek employment and would not discourage continued development of 
private savings and insurance, and social insurance systems. The cost 
of the program was estimated at $6 billion annually; and a total of 10 
million households would benefit from the program. The Commission 
strongly recommended that the benefit levels be raised as quickly as
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is practical and possible in the future. If the payment levels were 
set at the poverty line (1967's), the program would cost about $27 
billion a year and provide cash benefits to a total of 24 million 
households. The new universal income maintenance program was 
proposed to be adopted along with specific changes in existing 
programs. The Commission on Income Maintenance Programs also made 
some specific recommendations concerning reform of the existing welfare 
system (President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, 1969).
The Family Assistance Plan
On August 8, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon announced a major 
welfare reform proposal called the Family Assistance Plan.^ This plan 
would guarantee an annual federal payment of $1,600 to a family of 
four with no income. Families would be eligible for payments on a 
decreasing scale until their incomes reached $3,920 a year (Nixon, 1969), 
This Family Assistance Plan is apparently a negative income tax program 
(Peterson, 1973: 324). It is believed that Mr. Nixon's Family Assistance 
Plan is based on and draws heavily upon the recommendations proposed in 
the final report of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance 
Programs (Moynihan, 1973: 133).
In his televised address, Mr. Nixon indicated that the proposed 
Family Assistance Plan would revamp the much-criticized present 
system. Under the present system (as of 1969) , benefit levels are 
grossly unequal. For a mother with three children, benefits range 
from an average of $263 a month in one state down to an average of $39 
in another state. One result of this inequality is to create
^A preliminary analysis and evaluation of the Family Assistance 
Plan (1970 version) has been attempted by Bawden, Cain, and Hausman 
(1971).
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unbalanced interregional migration of the poor. Many of these people 
move into already overcrowded inner cities, thus aggravating existing 
social and economic problems in these areas (Nixon, 1969).
The present system also creates increases in the incidence of 
desertion. In most states a family is not eligible for welfare if a 
father is present, even though he is unable to support his family or 
to find a job. In order to make the children eligible for welfare, he 
has to leave home and the children are denied the authority, the 
discipline and the love that come from a father being present in the 
home (Nixon, 1969).
Mr. Nixon also pointed out that the present system often makes it 
possible to receive more money on welfare than on a low-paying job, 
thus reducing a person's incentive to work. It is therefore unfair 
to the working poor. All of these inequalities were considered wrong 
and indefensible by the President. His Family Assistance Plan would 
benefit the working poor, as well as the non-working; families with 
dependent children headed by a father, as well as those headed by a 
mother; and a uniform basic federal minimum income in every state 
(Nixon, 1969).
Nixon's formula for the Family Assistance Plan states that 
"For a family of four now on welfare, with no outside income, the 
basic federal payment would be $1,600 a year. States could add to 
that amount and most states would add to it. In no case would anyone's 
present level of benefits be lowered. At the same time— outside earnings 
would be encouraged, not discouraged. The new worker could keep the 
first $60 a month of outside earnings with no reduction in his benefits; 
then beyond that, his benefits would be reduced by only fifty cents for
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each dollar earned. By the same token, a family head already employed 
at low wages could get a family assistance supplement; those who work 
would no longer be discriminated against. For example, a family of 
five in which the father earns $2,000 a year— which is the hard fact 
of life for many families in America today— would get family assistance 
payments of $1,260, so that they would have a total income of $3,260.
A family of seven earning $3,000 a year would have its income raised 
to $4,360." (Nixon, 1969).
The Administration introduced the Family Assistance Bill (HR14173) 
in October 1969. The House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on 
the bill and drafted a new bill (HR 16311) which was passed by the 
House with a 243-155 roll-call vote on April 16, 1970. However,
HR 16311 was opposed in the Senate Finance Committee where liberals 
complained that the bill's benefit payments were too low and conserva­
tives argued that the bill was too costly (Congressional Quarterly, 
1971a; 1199). On November 20, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee 
voted on the Family Assistance Plan and rejected it by a 10-6 vote 
(Congressional Quarterly, 1970: 2852),
In January 1971, President Nixon repeated, in his State of the 
Union Message, his strong support for the Family Assistance Plan and 
listed it as one of his six great goals for action by the 92nd Congress, 
The House Ways and Means Committee began meeting in executive session 
in late January 1971 and reintroduced the Family Assistance Plan with 
other welfare, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid programs to the 
92nd Congress as House bill HR 1, This time the basic benefit level 
was set at $2,400 for a family of four and the marginal rate of 
taxation at 67 percent (Table 3). HR 1 also proposed that families
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Annual amounts used for clarity— actual computations would be 
quarterly.
2Computation; Reduce total earnings by $720 annual "disregard"; 
then apply two-thirds of the remainder to reduce assistance 
payment.
icLeast amount payable is $10 per month or $120 per, year.
Source: House Ways and Means Committee Report No. 92-231, U.S. 
Congress, 1971.
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and adults eligible for benefits under the Family Assistance Plan 
programs be excluded from participation in the current Food Stamp 
program (Congressional Quarterly, 1971a: 1201, 1203, and 1205).
On June 22, 1971, the House again voted on the Family Assistance 
Plan. It was passed by a 288-132 roll-call vote, a larger margin 
showing more support for the plan than was the case a year ago 
(Congressional Quarterly, 1971b: 1367). However, on April 28, 1972, 
the Senate Finance Committee again rejected the Family Assistance Plan 
and decided, by a 10-4 vote, that welfare recipients able to work must 
do so or lose all of their family benefits (Congressional Quarterly, 
1972a: 1016). This new version of the Family Assistance Plan is 
known as the "workfare" plan.
A third plan was also proposed by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff 
of Connecticut, a former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
in the Kennedy Administration. It would set a guaranteed annual 
income of $2,600 for a family of four with no outside income, with 
future raises tied to increases in the cost of living (Congressional 
Quarterly, 1972b: 2628-2629),
All three proposals were rejected by the Senate on October 4, 
1972. Instead, the Senate, by a 46-40 vote, approved a plan to test 
these three rival welfare reform proposals. This plan came from an 
amendment sponsored by Senators William V. Roth, Jr. (R. Del.) and 
Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Ind. Va.). The period during which the tests 
would be conducted would extend from two to four years, and $400- 
million a year would be authorized to carry them out. The Adminis­
tration and the General Accounting Office would have to set up and 
supervise the testing program and report to Congress on results
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every six months after the program began. When the tests were 
completed, data collected would be utilized by Congress to authorize 
and formulate permanent welfare reforms (Congressional Quarterly,
1972b; 2629).
Since then, these experiments have been conducted and their 
preliminary results are now in. These, with the results of other 
similar experiments, conducted by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare and the Office of Economic Opportunity since 
1968, indicate that even with a guaranteed income, poor people worked 
nearly as hard as ever. Husbands reduced their work effort by only a 
few percentage points, as did women heading one-parent families. Wives 
in two-parent families showed a greater reduction, from 10 to 30 percent, 
in their labor supply. The overall conclusion of these experiments 
suggests that poor people want to work, and they will continue to do so 
even with a guaranteed income. Thus, a guaranteed income will not 
significantly increase welfare dependency (Cherlin, 1977; 14).
Although the experiments set up to test all three versions of the 
Family Assistance Plan (FAP) have been conducted and the results 
collected. Congress has so far failed to act or make decisions on the 
fate of the plan. Many believe that the FAP is dead. But hopes for 
the FAP have recently been rekindled by President Carter’s welfare 
reform plan (HR 9030), proposed on August 6, 1977, because of the 
striking similarities between the two plans.^ According to Mr. Carter, 
this proposal would scrap the existing melange of welfare programs and 
replace them with a better single plan. This plan would provide jobs
XBoth are proposals for a so-called negative income tax (Schorr, 
1978: 49).
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for those who need work, provide fairer and more uniform cash benefits, 
promote family stability, and improve the self-respect of recipients 
(Gest, 1977a: 1699).
It would accomplish these goals by spending $30.7 billion to create
1.4 million public service jobs, provide a basic cash benefit to the 
needy, relieve the financial burden on every state by at least 10 percent
the first year of the plan in fiscal 1981 and include benefits for the
working poor. About 32 million persons would receive benefits under the 
new system which would replace the existing Aid to Families with Depen­
dent Children, Supplemental Security Income for the aged, blind and 
disabled, and food stamp programs with the flat cash payments. About
30 million persons receive aid under the above existing programs at 
the present time. The initial annual cost of the Carter plan, $30.7 
billion in 1978 dollars, is about $2.8 billion more than the cost of 
existing programs (Gest, 1977a: 1699-1701).
The major difference between the two plans is that while Nixon's
FAP encouraged recipients to work, it did not provide any jobs (Gest,
1977a: 1701; and Schorr, 1978: 49), The Carter plan would provide
1.4 million public service jobs while trying to hold the unemployment 
rate at 5,6 percent. According to the Carter plan, recipients would 
be divided into two tiers-— those who were required to work and those 
who were not. The upper one was for those not expected to work or 
for whom no job was available— the aged, blind and disabled, single 
parents with children under 7, single parents with children between
7 and 13 if a job and day care were not available and two-parent 
families with children if one parent was incapacitated. The lower 
tier was for those expected to work— two-parent families with children,
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single parents with their youngest child over 13, and single persons 
and childless couples unable to find full-time work (Gest, 1977a: 
1702-1703).
Both Nixon and Carter welfare plans would require states’ 
participation of varying degrees. Under the FAP, states were required 
to make up the difference between the basic federal payment and the 
states' existing benefit level. No state could contribute less than 
50 percent of existing total gross costs but none was required to 
contribute more than 90 percent of the existing level. The Carter plan 
promised the states an immediate 10 percent reduction in their welfare 
costs with additional help over the first three years (Gest, 1977a: 
1701).
The Carter welfare plan (HR 9030) is still being considered by 
the House of Representatives. A special House subcommittee concluded 
the first round of deliberations on HR 9030 but put off untill 1978 
discussion of the sticky question of how to create jobs for the poor. 
Before the subcommittee adjourned on December 16, 1977, it endorsed 
most of the general concepts in the President Carter's plan. The 
subcommittee agreed to the Administration's proposed federal benefit—  
$4,200 for a family of four with no member expected to work and 
$2,300 for a four-person family with a member expected to work.
Benefit levels would be adjusted annually to reflect changes in the 
cost of living (Gest, 1977b: 2658).
CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE 
FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN
The economic and social impacts of various income maintenance 
programs are profound and complex. As of today, no comprehensive 
and systematic study of these impacts has been attempted. This fact 
well illustrates the complexity and difficulties of carrying out 
studies of this nature. The problems associated with studies of this 
type are many besides the prohibitive costs involved with them. First, 
many of the present income maintenance programs have a very short 
program history (less than 15 years). Results from these programs 
are unsuitable for predicting their long-term effects. Some programs 
may be subject to the year-to-year discretion of Congress. The lack 
of permanency of these programs may prevent recipients from forming 
long-term changes or adjustments in their respective economic and 
social behavior.
Second, the problems of collecting and selecting adequate data are 
formidable. These problems are attributable to the complexity and 
overlap of the present income maintenance programs. Programs have been 
initiated by different governmental agencies and have had different 
criteria and rules. Recipients can be simultaneously on several 
programs of different nature and origin, and, thus, have their program 
benefits and requirements all being affected by one another. Therefore, 
it is extremely difficult to monitor recipients of multi-programs, let 
alone to collect data on the program effects. Third, studies of the 
economic and social impacts of income maintenance programs are of
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interdisciplinary nature. Up to the present, no sound efforts have been 
attempted to organize and coordinate a comprehensive study of these 
impacts.
Thus, in this chapter, the analysis of the potential economic and 
social impacts of a proposed income maintenance program, the Family 
Assistance Plan, will be attempted by a synthesis of various theoretical 
and empirical studies of these impacts of the Family Assistance Plan and 
other relevant income maintenance programs; and by a theoretical 
inference of additional impacts that have received little or no atten­
tion. Impacts of a long-term nature, such as those affecting regional 
migration and regional economic growth in the long run, will be analyzed 
in a more theoretical and inferential framework in Chapter VI. The 
potential social and economic impacts of the Family Assistance Plan and 
that of some present income maintenance programs are summarized in 
Table 4.
Impact on Regional Labor Supply
To many opponents of the Family Assistance Plan, this guaranteed 
annual income poses a serious ethical problem. It has long been 
believed in America that everyone should work who possibly can do so—  
for his own mental health, his physical well-being, the good of the 
economy and the smooth functioning of society (Macarov, 1970; 86).
These beliefs have guided American attitudes toward work for many 
generations. Wealthy individuals have continued to work, even though 
their wealth does not require them to do so. The Family Assistance 
Plan would guarantee a family of four with no outside income a minimum 
annual income of $2,400. The family can have an additional outside
inen
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PRESENT WELFARE 
SYSTEM AND THE PROPOSED FAP
















(AFDC+FS) - N N - + + N + — + — —
FAP - N - + — + + + — +, - +
+ Positive effects 
- Negative effects 
N No, or insignificant effects
Source: Author.
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Income of up to $720 without the $2,400 being reduced. Many Americans 
believe that distributing non-earned income to the poor will inevitably
reduce their incentive to work, which is an evil. Senator Herman
Talmadge (D. Georgia), a leading opponent of the Family Assistance Plan, 
said "The Administration has sold this bill (FAP) to the American people 
as a work incentive. It isn’t. It’s a work dis-incentive. We should 
pay people to work instead of paying them not to work." (Moynihan, 1973: 
378).
Income maintenance programs, such as the Family Assistance Plan, 
have two types of effect on labor supply, namely an income effect and
a substitution effect. The income effect is associated with the cash
transfer payments received by the recipients. Although this income 
can be used to purchase more market goods, part of it can also be 
used to purchase increased leisure, hence a reduction in labor supply 
by the recipients. The substitution effect is associated with the
marginal tax rate on outside income earned by the recipients. The
tax rate on outside income reduces the amount of market goods and 
services that can be obtained in return for an hour's work. Therefore, 
it encourages those who are taxed to reduce their work effort (Greenberg 
and Fosters, 1970a). The extent of income and substitution effects on 
labor supply varies with the minimum benefit level and marginal tax 
rate. Any empirical analysis of the impact on labor supply of alterna­
tive income maintenance programs requires estimates of the labor supply 
responses to the income and substitution effects.
Labor Supply of Male Family Heads
Greenberg and Fosters (1970a) have attempted to measure the effects 
of income maintenance programs, including the FAP, on the hours of work
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of male family heads. Their study is based on the assumption that in­
formation on the systematic relation between work choices and differences 
in wage rates and income levels can be used to infer the response of a 
typical worker faced with changes in these variables similar to the 
differences observed. A national sample of approximately 6,000 
households, headed by married males under 62 years old, was drawn from 
the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity file. The labor supply response 
parameters were estimated by regression techniques.
Three sets of supply parameters estimates were obtained for
analyzing labor supply responses to alternative income maintenance 
programs (Table 5). The high and the low estimates represent the 
maximum and minimum responses that were estimated from the data. The 
intermediate set of estimates is considered as the most likely response. 
It suggests that a one percent decrease in a male family head’s wage 
rate or a one percent increase in his marginal tax rate would cause him 
to reduce his hours of work by two-tenths of one percent through the 
substitution effect. A one dollar increase in income received by his 
family would induce him to reduce his work effort by one-tenth of an 
hour through the income effect. His labor earnings would be reduced 
by twenty cents for each additional dollar of income at a wage rate of
two dollars per hour (Greenberg and Rosters, 1970a; 4).
These labor supply parameters were used in a simulation of the 
costs, the impact on incomes, and the changes in work patterns that 
might result from the extension to the working poor of income 
maintenance programs. Estimates of the labor supply response to 
changes in the family head’s wage rate, net of taxes, and in family 
income were obtained by measuring the differences in annual hours of
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. TABLE 5
LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSES TO INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS
Substitution Effect Income Effect
(Elasticity) (Slope Coefficient)
Low Estimate .10 -.09
Intermediate Estimate .20 -.10
High Estimate .25 -.11
Source: Greenberg and Kosters, 1970a: 4.
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labor supplied by workers with different wages and different levels of 
non-employment income. The impact of these programs on an average 
participating family is shown in Table 6. The aggregate impact of 
alternative income maintenance programs was also estimated using the 
intermediate labor response estimates (Table 7). The hours reductions 
and production losses associated with alternative income maintenance 
programs were then placed into economic perspective (Table 8). The 
findings in Table 8 indicate that male heads of families participating 
in both Family Assistance Plan and Food Stamp program (FAP+FSP) 
would reduce their labor supply by 18.7 percent. The total hours 
worked by all married male family heads under 62 years of age would be 
reduced by somewhat more than 1 percent. The output produced by all 
such persons would drop by about .6 percent. Hours worked by the 
entire labor force would be reduced by only one-half of one percent 
and labor's contribution to national output by about three-tenths 
of one percent.
A breakdown of these results for selected demographic groups 
reveals interesting patterns. Under the FAP+FSP program, the hours 
reduction of black married male family heads under 62 would be nearly 
5 percent of total hours worked by both participants and non-participants 
in that group, compared to less than 1 percent for whites. The 
differential probably reflects the disproportionately low incomes of 
black families rather than that blacks are more responsive to work 
incentives than whites. Other demographic groups with large labor 
supply reductions are families who live in the South Census Region, 
families who live in rural areas, and families with six or more members 
(Greenberg and Rosters, 1970a; 10).
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Table 6
SELECTED MEASURES OF THE IMPACT OF FAP+FSP® ON AN "AVERAGE" 








Annual Pre-program Hrs. of 
Family Head 1950 1950 1950
Hrs. Reduction by Family Head 237 365 436
Annual Pre-program Family Income 3941 3941 3941
Annual Subsidy 1625 1760 1835
Net Increase in Family Income 1189 1094 1042
Notes:
FAP+FSP participants receive both Family Assistance payments and food 
stamps. FAP provides a guarantee of $400 to a family with no other source 
of income plus $300 for each family member. Earnings in excess of $720 are 
taxed at 50 percent. FSP provides a guarantee of $296 to each family plus 
$184 to each family member. It taxes family income -- including any subsidies 
received under FAP -- at an 18 percent rate.
^The three sets of estimates used are those reported in Table 5.
Source: Greenberg and Rosters, 1970a: 6.
Table 7
SELECTED MEASURES OF AGGREGATE IMPACT USING THE INTERMEDIATE LABOR
RESPONSE ESTDiATES
FAP+FSP* High Tax Rate-High 
Guarantee Program*




Number of Participating Families 
(thousands) 2316 5412 7457 4004
Total Program Subsidy Cost 
($ millions) 4077 13748 9336 4926
Total Pre-Program Income of 
Participating Families 
($ millions)
9127 27715 41916 18310
Net change in income of 
participating families 
($ millions)
2647 8601 4889 2675
Total Loss in Production 
(reduction in head's 
earings)
($ millions)
1430 5147 4447 2251
Notes: ^
These programs all decompose into two components; (1) a Food Stamp Component and (2) a Family
Assistance component. All participating families are covered by both components. The Food Stamp 
component is identical for all three programs and is described in the notes to Table 6. The Family 
Assistance component of the High Tax Rate program taxes earnings in excess of $720 at 75 percent, while 
the Low Tax Rate program taxes these earnings at 25 percent. The High Guarantee under the Family Assistance 
component is $500 per family plus $750 per family member. The Low Guarantee is $400 per family plus $300 per 
family member.
^ This program is based on the proposals of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs.
Income.is taxed at a 50 percent rate.The guarantee is $600 per family plus $450 per family member. 
Source: Greenberg and Kosters, 1970a: 9.
Table 8
SELECTED MEASURES OF HOURS ADJUSTMENTS AND PRODUCTION LOSSES
FAP+FSP* High Tax Rate-High 
Guarantee Program^




Total Program Subsidy Cost 4077 13748 9336 4926
($ millions)
Total reduction in hours as a 7. of 
pre-program hours worked by:
married male heads^ of participating 
families 18.7 24.0 12.5 14.8
married male heads of participating 
and non-participating families 1.2 3.7 2,7 1.6
total labor force 0.5 1.7 1.3 0.7
Total production loss as a 7* of pre- 
pre-program earnings of
married male heads of participating 
families 17.7 21.2 12.1 14.7
married male heads of participating 
and non-participating families 0.6 2.1 1.8 0.9
total labor force 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.5
Notes:
*These programs are described in Tables 6 and 7.
^Family heads on which these results are based are less than 62 years of age.
Source: Greenberg and Koatera, 1970a: 11.
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Greenberg and Kosters' estimates were based on an assumption that 
the states will not supplement federal payments to poor households 
headed by working males (1970a). Under the Family Assistance Plan, a 
state would be required to supplement the difference between the 
proposed federal payment level and the state’s current level of payment 
for all those currently eligible for welfare. State supplementation 
is not required nor precluded for poor households headed by working 
males. Therefore, the state, or city, may decide to supplement the 
incomes of these households on its own.
The extension of state (or city) supplements to families headed 
by poor working males would considerably complicate the analysis of 
the impact on labor supply of various income maintenance programs.
An example was provided by Greenberg’s (1971) study of the impact of 
income guarantees (FAP+FSP and that of the President’s Commission on 
Income Maintenance Programs) on labor supply in New York City. The 
results indicate that the addition of state supplements in New York 
City would have a dramatic impact. Total subsidy costs would 
increase by five-fold, from around $200 million to about one billion 
dollars, and the total loss in hours and in production by almost 
four-fold, from about 2.2 percent (of the total hours worked by all 
married male family heads in the city under 62 years of age) to over 
8 percent, and from about 1,6 percent to over 6 percent respectively 
(Greenberg, 1971, pp. vii and vili). The immediate policy implication 
of these state (or city) supplements is that they will increase total 
program costs, perpetuate disparities in minimum benefit levels among 
states, and maintain much of the existing inequality of treatment 
based on family structure and work patterns.
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Greenberg's (1971) findings (Table 9) indicate that the gross 
hours reduction of black married male family heads under 62, as a percent 
of total hours worked by both participants and non-participants in that 
group, would be nearly 5 percent under FAP+FSP and over 17 percent 
after FAP+FSP was supplemented with state welfare payments (state 
supplements, or SS). The comparable percentages for whites are .9 
percent and 6.5 percent respectively. Other demographic groups with 
large reductions in work effort are families with six or more members 
and families with annual incomes of less than $4,000.
Labor Supply of Women
The effects of welfare reform, such as the FAP, would be greater 
on the female labor supply than that of male labor. DeTray (1972:14) 
points out that wives work less in the market than their husbands not 
simply because their wages are lower than their husbands' (most women 
are in low wage service occupations), but also because wives have 
higher productivity in household production, or non-market production. 
With the availability of Family Assistance incomes to women with 
dependent children and the high marginal tax rate on earnings, the 
supply of female labor would show some considerable decline.
A study was conducted by the President's Commission on Income 
Maintenance Programs to estimate the impact of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) on the work effort of female heads of poor 
families. This study utilized 1967 data on AFDC recipients in the 
Southern states of Alabama, Kentucky and Mississippi. The results 
tend to support the hypothesis that AFDC will have some negative 
effect on the work incentive of female heads of poor families. The 
income effect of the guarantee level was negative; and the elasticity
TII8 ESTIKATBO IMPACT Of PAP+FSI' AND FAP-KSP-SS ON SEI.KCTKD DEHOCRAnilC CROUPS 
USING THE LOWER BOUND PROCEDURE
g
Hours Reduction as a Per­centage of All Hours Worked 
by Demographic Group
Production Loss as a Per­centage of Total Earnings 
of Demographic Group
Percentage Distribution of the Total Subsidy by 
Demographic Croup
FAP+FSP® FAP-FSP-SS*’ FAP+FSP* FAP-FSP-SS** FAP+FSP* FAP-FSP-SS**
Baaed on the High Subatltutlon and Income Effect Estinatea (c" ■ .30 and » .163
Total 1.56 8.38 1.08 6.40 100.00 100.00
RaceWhite 0.86 6.50 0.61 4.98 42.93 60.70Black . 4.73 17.34 4.03 15.72 57.04 39.30
Age 14 to 25 years 0.25 3.21 0.18 2.74 1.52 3.3625 to 55 years 2.02 9.89 1.39 7.62 96.14 89.5355 to 62 years 0.20 4.42 0.12 2.67 2.34 7.16
Sire of family5 persons or fewer 0.68 8.31 0.40 6.16 28.06 58.266 persons or nor# 10.27 26.96 9.37 25.61 71.94 41.74
Total family income$4000 or less 12.17 26.87 11.78 27.10 30.46 15.69over $4000 1.09 7.56 0.60 5.86 69.54 84.30
Based on the Low Substitution and Income Effect Estimates (c* ” .08 and - -.08)
Total 0.47 2.53 0.33 1.93 100.00 100.00
RaceWhite 0.25 1.89 0.18 1.45 40.91 57.96Black 1.49 5.59 1.27 5.06 59.05 42.04
Ago 14 to 25 years 0.08 0.99 0.06 0.86 1.62 3.4525 to 55 years 0.61 3.01 0.42 2.31 95.88 69.6655 to 62 years 0.06 1.23 0.04 0.75 2.50 6.93
Sice of family, 5 persons or fewer 0.21 2.33 0.12 1,72 29.17 53.806 persons or more 3.08 9.23 2.81 8.82 70.83 46.21
Total family income$4000 or less 3.62 9.47 3.52 9.51 31.24 18.53over $4000 0.33 2.23 0.24 1.73 68.76 81.47
"Refer* to the FAP+FSP eegment of the TAF-FSP package. 
R̂efera to the entire FAP-FSP-SS package.
SQurce: Greenbergp 1971: 80.
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of labor force participation with respect to the guarantee level was 
about .4. It was estimated that in these three states a 50 percent 
increase in the benefit level (averaged $50 per month in the three 
states in 1967) would have produced about a 20 percent reduction in 
labor force participation of AFDC mothers, from about 30 percent.
The net effect of the marginal tax rate on earnings was also negative; 
and the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the 
tax rate varied between .3 and .4. Therefore, in these states, a 16 
percent reduction in the mean tax rate, from 60 percent to 50 percent, 
would have caused a 7 percent increase in labor force participation 
among these AFDC mothers (Hausman and Kasper, 1971; 99-100).
Durbin (1968) and Gordon (1969) point out that the fast rising 
guarantee level in AFDC (faster than average or minimum wages) and 
its 100 percent marginal tax rate have induced more and more poor 
female family heads with dependent children to leave work and go on 
AFDC. Also, state and municipal supplements have complicated the 
situation. Durbin (1968) discovered that in New Yrok City welfare 
allowances rose by almost 40 percent between 1962 and 1966, compared 
to a 13 percent increase for average wages and a 30 percent increase 
for minimum wages over the same time period. Therefore, by 1966, 
a 2,000 hours per year minimum wage income was less than the welfare 
allowance for a family of four in that city. In the entire state 
of New York, average welfare grant levels also rose by about 45 
percent between 1964 and 1968 (Gordon, 1969).
The AFDC program can, however, only be considered as a special 
case of more general negative income tax programs. The AFDC's 100 
percent marginal tax rate seems to discourage AFDC mothers to take
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outside jobs, whereas the much lower tax rates of the FAP and the plan 
recommended by the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs 
were chosen to encourage their participants to make outside earnings. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect the negative impact of 
the FAP and other income maintenance programs on the female labor 
supply to be smaller than the AFDC would suggest. These reductions 
in female labor supply under alternative income maintenance programs 
may be significant only over short-run periods. When much longer time 
periods are considered, the negative effects of welfare payments on 
the labor supply of women, especially that of married women, would 
be weak or negligible.
Schultz (1975) has attempted empirical estimates of long-run 
labor supply functions for currently married women for ten age and 
race groups from data drawn from the 1967 Survey of Economic 
Opportunity. The results indicate that the elasticity of labor 
supply with respect to the woman’s own market wage rate is positive 
and large in every case, ranging systematically over the life cycle 
from .25 to 2.09, from a high at the youngest and oldest age groups 
to a low for women between the ages of 35 and 44, when child-rearing 
restricts participation among all race and education groups.
In contrast, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
their husbands' wage is negative, and of the same order of magnitude, 
ranging from -.38 to -1.65. This response parameter is found to be 
highest among women 25 to 34 and falling irregularly among older 
women. Only weak evidence is found for a negative nonemployment 
income effect on labor supply, and only among older white women.
The wage elasticity estimates for black and white samples are fairly
48
similar with somewhat larger absolute value for whites than for 
blacks (Schultz, 1975).
Therefore, the findings of Schultz (1975) suggest that this 
growing component of the labor force may not alter their long-run 
market supply of labor under varying tax-subsidy schemes, if husband 
and wife experience the same marginal tax on market earnings. In 
contrast to past studies of the labor supply behavior of married women, 
Schultz's estimates show only weak or negligible income effects of 
nonemployment income and strong negative effects of husband's permanent 
market wage rate. If income supports for married women were increased 
and their market earnings heavily taxed, many would expect currently 
married women to reduce their market supply of labor. But, the 
estimates presented by Schultz suggest that a uniform tax on market 
earnings of husband and wife would only change slightly the age 
composition of the currently married female labor force, and not 
diminish its overall size (1975, pp. vi and vii).
Labor Supply of Married Couples
Greenberg and Hosek (1976) have examined the potential impacts of 
various negative income tax (NIT) programs on the work incentive of 
husbands and wives who are not aged and are in families where both 
are present. The income and substitution effects for these husbands 
and wives under a variety of NITs have been estimated through 
statistical analysis of cross-sectional data. Their estimates for 
husband and wife's own substitution and cross substitution effects 
also indicate that the husband's labor supply is apparently unre­
sponsive to changes in the wife's price of time, but the wife's 
labor supply is usually sensitive to changes in the husband's wage rate.
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A simulation methodology was then used to estimate regional and 
national labor supply responses to alternative NITS. The findings 
of their study show that under reasonable assumptions, even a very 
generous NIT would only cause a decrease in hours worked by the 
labor force of considerably less than 1 percent (Greenberg and 
Hosek, 1976, page v)»
The geographical distribution of these reductions in labor supply 
has been estimated by Greenberg and Hosek (1976). The findings are 
presented in Table 10. Under a truly national NIT with identical 
standards throughout the United States, the reductions in labor supply 
are likely to be greater in the South due to the geographical concen­
tration of potential NIT recipients. Currently, states in other 
regions have more generous welfare programs than do states in the 
South. If these differences in welfare payments could be maintained 
to some extent under an NIT, as suggested by Greenberg (1971), the 
reductions in labor supply induced by an NIT might be more evenly 
distributed between the major regions of the United States than would 
be the case with an NIT with uniform standards (Greenberg and Hosek, 
1976, p. v).
Impact on Regional Consumption 
One of the most important factors affecting consumer behavior is 
disposable income. An income maintenance program such as the FAP would 
increase the disposable incomes of the recipient families in an area 
and hence affecting their consumption behavior. Changes in consumer 
expenditures on different goods and services are the more direct 
effects of an income maintenance program. The nature and magnitude
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Table 10
ESTIMATED REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 





1. Number of families participating 
(millions) 1.3 1.9 2.9 1.2
2. Net total program subsidy® 
($ billions) 1.6 2.7 4.3 1.5
3. Increase in income of partic­
ipating families ($ billions) 1.0 1.8 3.2 1.0
4. Decrease in earnings of partic­
ipating families ($ billions) 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.6
5. Reduction in hours of work as 
percent of pre-program hours 
of pre-retirement husband and 
wife families 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.7
6. Percent of participants in 
poverty before NIT 13.1 16.9 21.4 18.5
7. Percent of those initially in 
poverty crossing the poverty 
line 64.7 80.1 77.4 61.9
^Lines 3 and 4 may not sum to line 2 because of rounding errors.
Source: Greenberg and Hosek, 1976, page xii.
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of these changes, however, will depend on several important factors, 
namely the way the plan is financed, the parameters of the plan, the 
extent of poverty in the community, and the marginal propensity to 
consume different goods and services of the recipients as well as non­
recipients in the community or region (Kottis, 1973).
If the government finances the income maintenance plan by increasing 
taxation (such as the FAP), the disposable incomes and the expenditures 
of taxpayers in the community (local, state, region, or nation) will 
decrease while the incomes and expenditures of the recipients will 
increase, and the net change in expenditures may be smaller than is 
conceived (Kottis, 1973). If the income maintenance plan is financed 
by other means, the incomes and expenditures of individuals other than 
the recipients will not be directly affected.
The changes in the expenditures on different goods and services 
in a given community will depend upon the way the recipients spend 
their increased incomes. Kottis (1973) noted that there is almost 
no empirical evidence concerning how low income people spend their 
income supplements. She assumes that low income people will spend 
supplements from a permanent income maintenance plan just as they 
do ordinary income. Thus, she suggested the use of existing surveys 
of consumer expenditures such as the 1960-1961 Survey of Consumer 
Expenditures conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
Department of Agriculture for estimating the potential consumer 
response to various levels of income maintenance (Kottis, 1973).
Moeller (1970) has used this set of data to formulate the 
marginal propensities to spend on different goods and services of 
different income and demographic groups to study household budget
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responses to negative tax simulations. Based on these marginal 
propensities to spend and the estimated increase in income maintenance 
payments if FAP is enacted, Kottis (1973) made forecasts about changes 
in different types of expenditures for the country as a whole. She 
predicted that the largest part of the additional income would be 
spent on food, clothing, and shelter, but none of the national markets 
for different goods and services would expand more than eight-tenths 
of one percent. The situation, however, will vary in different 
communities.
In a more complex model, Golladay and Haveman (1977) estimated 
the nature of the adjustments in consumption expenditures, gross 
output, and employment Induced by the FAP and a negative income tax 
(NIT). They found that both FAP and NIT gross transfers would 
generate approximately $3.7 billion of consumption expenditures.
Induced consumption is 112 percent of gross transfers for FAP and 
about 109 percent for NIT. In percentage terms, the sectoral impact 
of the final demands is nearly identical for the two transfer programs. 
In both cases, the bulk of the demands (66-67 percent) is placed on 
the manufacturing sector; over two-thirds of these demands are 
concentrated in nondurable goods manufacturing. The service industries 
account for an additional 30 percent of the total demand from the two 
programs. A more detailed sectoral breakdown indicates that food and 
kindred products receive the largest impact (about 21 percent in both 
cases), followed by motor vehicles (about 9 percent), and medical and 
educational services (about 11 percent).
The increased consumption of services, especially publicly 
provided services such as publicly funded schools and subsidized
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medical care, by the recipients is brought about by the increased 
tax rates on the time spent working (market time). The recipients 
will have more time due to a reduction in hours of work for the 
consumption of the highly time-intensive services both public and 
private (DaVanzo and Greenberg, 1974; 16-17).
The parameters of an income maintenance plan, such as the 
eligibility requirements, the minimum benefit levels, and the tax 
rates on the outside incomes, are important for they would determine 
the amount of total as well as disposable incomes each recipient 
family would receive, and hence its expenditures on various goods 
and services.
Since the poor are unevenly distributed over the country, 
regions or communities with higher concentration of the poor will 
receive greater amounts of income maintenance payments, hence greater 
increases in consumer expenditures. Small communities tend to have 
relatively more labor-intensive and low-wage industries and are likely 
to have a large concentration of low income people eligible to receive 
benefits under an income maintenance plan. Large communities usually 
have more capital-intensive, high-wage, and more diversified industries 
than do small communities. Therefore, the transfer payments may induce 
greater changes in consumer expenditures in small communities than in 
large communities. Similarly, rural communities and communities in 
the South may experience more intense changes in expenditures for goods 
and services than do urban communities in the North (Kottis, 1973) .
Golladay and Haveman's (1977) study yielded very interesting 
findings which seem to support the view expressed above. For both 
FAP and NIT, the pattern of induced expenditures by region is similar
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to the regional pattern of gross benefits of the programs. The only 
source of difference from the regional pattern of gross benefits is 
the varying regional average marginal propensities to consume. For 
FAP, this ratio ranges from 1.67 in New York to about 1.10 in several 
regions in the deep South. For NIT, the ratio is approximately 
1.08-1.09 in all of the regions. In both simulations, the largest 
induced increase in consumer expenditures occurs in the South— 46 
percent for both FAP and NIT. The Northeast has the smallest induced 
increase for both FAP and NIT (11 percent and 15 percent, respectively).
If the income maintenance program is financed by the increased 
taxation, such as the FAP, the tax burden will not be borne out evenly 
throughout the country. The more affluent regions tend to pay more 
taxes and receive less program benefits while the less affluent ones 
due to their greater share of the poor will pay less taxes and receive 
more program benefits. How would these disparities between the regional 
pattern of program benefits and the regional pattern of program taxation 
affect the regional pattern of consumption? The effects of taxes on 
consumption would be negative, i.e., reduction in consumption expendi­
tures. These effects may be greater in the rich regions than in the 
poor ones.
Golladay and Haveman's (1977) study offers strong supportive 
findings for the above hypothesis. The tax-induced reduction in 
consumption would differ slightly between the two programs ($2.07 
billion for FAP and $2.13 billion for NIT), but the regional distri­
butions of the changed expenditures would be identical. Rich states, 
such as California, New York, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Texas, Indiana, and Illinois, would experience the greatest percentage
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reductions in consumer expenditures.
The net effect of the tax-transfers on household consumer expendi­
tures would be the sum of the positive effect of the gross transfers 
and the negative effect of the taxes required to finance the programs. 
The net effect would be positive due to the concentration of benefits 
among low-incpme households with high marginal consumption propensities 
and the concentration of tax burden on higher-income households with 
lower marginal consumption propensities.
Impact on Regional Demographic 
Characteristics
The potential Impacts of income maintenance programs on the 
demographic characteristics of the recipients have been constantly 
a debate issue among those concerned about welfare reform. These 
impacts may or may not affect recipients’ decisions to have more 
children, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and to form or 
dissolve families, including marriage, separation, desertion, divorce, 
and remarriage. Concern over these household composition effects of 
income maintenance programs has focused mainly on their hypothetical 
monetary incentives to alter composition that result from rules 
affecting eligibility and benefit structure (Mayo, 1976; 420).
Theoretically speaking, any reduction in the relative cost of 
children will induce some increase in desired family size on average 
if other important factors affecting fertility remain constant. Thus, 
an income maintenance program is expected to raise desired family 
size above the level that it would be without any government subsidies. 
The extent of the increase in desired family size will, however, depend 
on the value of total child subsidies from an income maintenance
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program relative to total perceived child costs. If families have 
the actual family size already exceeded desired family size, child 
subsidies in the form of income maintenance are likely to have an 
insignificant effect on fertility. But, if family planning has 
been perfect, and desired and actual family sizes are identical, 
child subsidies will have a direct effect on actual fertility through 
an increase in desired family size. Also, income maintenance programs 
with high marginal tax rates on earned income would considerably reduce 
the opportunity costs of remaining outside the labor force due to child 
bearing or child rearing for low-income women, thus having some positive 
effect on fertility. Of course, child subsidies of a permanent nature 
would have a greater effect on fertility than those temporary ones 
(Lloyd, 1974).
Although comprehensive empirical research on the potential effects 
of welfare programs on fertility is almost nonexistent, we would expect 
a certain positive effect of welfare payments on fertility. But for 
those who have attempted some empirical study of the potential effects 
of welfare programs on fertility, their findings tend to suggest that 
there is a rather mild positive effect on fertility (Lloyd, 1972;
Simon, 1972; Simon and Simon, 1972; and Cain, 1972). A contrasting 
viewpoint, however, was held by Baumol (1974) in summarizing the 
results of the New Jersey-Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiments.
He found that there was no discernible effect of transfer payments on 
fertility of the participant families. But the program life of the 
New Jersey-Pennsylvania project may be too short to produce any 
reliable predictions, let alone the conflicting effects of a temporary 
program on the long-term commitment such as child-bearing.
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The Family Assistance Plan would also have a positive effect on 
fertility. Under FAP, no family can receive guaranteed payments 
unless they have at least one child. This provision, according to 
De Tray (1972), would increase the demand for children. Since FAP 
would tax market time (time spent working) but not productive home 
time, household commodities (for example the enjoyment of children) 
that require large inputs of time from household members would become 
less expensive to the household compared to those that are goods-and- 
services-intensive. Consequently, FAP would make children more 
attractive to households because they would be less costly for the 
household to produce and maintain (De Tray, 1972; 19; Orr, 1971: 68; 
Sweet, 1971: 122; and Cain, 1971: 135-136). A simulation study by 
Cain (1972) has estimated the potential fertility effect of the FAP 
on the welfare population in the United States. Based on his own 
previously obtained estimates of the relationship between wives' 
earning potential and fertility, Cain predicted that the FAP would 
cause a very mild, 7,2 percent, increase in the birth rate among 
the poor.
Although income maintenance programs in general would have a 
very mild effect on fertility in the United States, this effect 
will not be felt evenly over the country. The South would be affected 
at a much greater magnitude due to its greater share of the poor in 
the country. Similarly, the rural and urban-ghetto areas of the more 
developed North and West regions would also have a considerable effect 
of income maintenance on their fertility rates.
Also, income maintenance programs, such as AFDC, are believed to 
have some positive effect on illegitimacy. One of the induced effects
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of the AFDC program is for poor women not to marry or live with the 
father of their children. Since eligibility for AFDC depends on 
having children and benefits increase with additional children, 
incentives for poor women either to bear legitimate children and not 
live with the father or to bear illegitimate children and neither 
marry nor live with the father would exist beyond those that would 
exist without the AFDC program (Mayo, 1976: 409). Empirical studies 
that have tried to measure the impact of such hypothetical incentives 
have produced no significant evidence to substantiate the hypothesis 
(Cutright, 1973, and 1971; Fechter and Greenfield, 1973; and Bernstein 
and Meezan, 1975). From an examination of the findings of these studies, 
it can be suggested that the potential effects of welfare on illegitimacy 
are probably very small or nonexistent. And it would be more so for 
programs like FAP, since FAP would use a family as filing unit and 
would provide aids to families with dependent children even when both 
parents are present.
The influence of income maintenance programs on family dissolution 
is contingent on their eligibility criteria. If programs exclude 
families headed by employable able-bodied male from eligibility, such 
as the AFDC, there may be some positive effect on family dissolution 
(MacDonald and Sawhill, 1978). But the strength of such effect is 
probably small. Programs which do not discriminate against intact 
families, such as the FAP, their impact on family dissolution is 
little and probably negative.
Honig (1973) has estimated the impact of AFDC on family dissolution 
with a model based on cross-sectional data for 44 metropolitan areas in 
1960 and 1970. Her model assumes an income-maximizing behavior by
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potential welfare recipients and includes as explanatory variables 
AFDC benefits, female wage and unemployment rates, male earning 
opportunities, female unearned but nonwelfare income, and welfare 
program restrictions that exclude some female families from eligibility. 
Based on her findings, she concludes that "high welfare payment levels 
do help to cause family splitting and do influence women heading 
families to become welfare recipients." But her results also indicate 
that such influence has been relatively small and has not been constant 
over time (ranging from a 3 to 4 percent increase in the proportion of 
all adult women who were family heads for a 10 percent increase in 
AFDC benefit levels in 1960 to only a 0.5 to 2 percent increase in 
female-headship rates for the same amount of increase in AFDC benefit 
levels in 1970). This small effect can be explained by the fact that 
the proportion of all adult women who are household heads is small 
Conly about 7 percent of female 14 years of age and older in 1970 were 
female heads of families).
Honig’s (1973) findings have been confirmed by another empirical 
study by Ross and Sawhill (1975). Their study used data from census 
Employment Survey for low income areas of 41 of the largest U.S. cities 
and 7 rural counties in 1970 to explain variations in rates of female- 
headship of families, They also used data from a five-year panel 
survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of 
Michigan (the Income Dynamics Survey) to study the determinants of 
marital dissolution and remarriage. Their model is similar to that 
of Honig (1973) and relates the proportion of women aged 16 to 54 
years who head families with children to variables that characterize 
the welfare system (especially the benefit level), female earnings
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possibilities, male labor force variables, and other variables such 
as region. They found that none of the welfare benefit variables 
was statistically significant for whites; but for nonwhites, a 10 
percent differential in welfare benefit levels seemed to cause about 
a 2 percent change in the rate at which women head families with 
children.
Ross and Sawhill (1975) tried to explain rates of separation and 
divorce and remarriage to a large number of variables that characterize 
relative economic opportunities of wives, socioeconomic status, cultural 
norms, and demographic controls. Their findings indicated that both 
family dissolution and remarriage rates were significantly related to 
welfare benefit levels relative to other opportunities. But, they 
pointed out that such a responsiveness is only a small component of the 
overall dynamic that is responsible for changing female-headed family 
stocks and flows. For a more broadened program, such as the FAP, Ross 
and Sawhill (1975) estimated that there would be a modest net reduction 
in the number of female-headed families. Preliminary results of the 
New Jersey-Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiment also indicate a 
similar effect (Baumol, 1974: 264).
Other effects of income maintenance programs were also suggested 
by Sweet (1971). For example, income maintenance programs might 
change marriage rates among young adults. The rate of remarriage 
for women with dependent children after marital disruption might be 
increased. This would follow from the fact that an income maintenance 




The Pattern of Benefit 
In order to evaluate the regional impact of the Family Assistance 
Plan, estimates were made of the total and per capita family assistance 
income to be received by each state. The state figures were sums of 
county estimates calculated by two equations:
where T. = estimated total family assistance payments to residents 
^ in county j ,
P „  = number of families in income class i in county j in 1969,
E „  = average family assistance for income class i in county j, and
n = six income classes: $0-999, 1000-1999, 2000-2999, 3000-3999, 
4000-4999, and 5000-5999.
E.. = A. - .667 [F, - 720 - W j  (2)J 1 3
where A. = family assistance payment for a family without outside
 ̂ income in county j (assuming that the family size is the 
integer closest to the average size of a family in the 
county),
.667 = marginal tax rate,
F^ = mid-value income for income class i,
720 = amount of income that can be earned by a family under the
plan without a reduction in family assistance payments,and
Wj = mean public assistance per county in 1969,
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The assistance formula was taken from a congressional committee 
report (U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, 1971). Family, income, 
and mean public assistance data were drawn from the 1970 census (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1970).
The estimates derived from this formula are believed to be 
conservative in several respects. Family sizes in poorer income 
classes may be larger than in more affluent ones causing under­
estimation of Aj. Incomes in various classes may be downwardly 
skewed making F^ higher than the mean income in the class. Since 
the values of are based on assistance levels in the 1971 plan, they
should probably be adjusted upward for the current economic environ­
ment. Also, the subtraction of current public assistance payments 
(estimated by W^) from current income may introduce an opposing bias 
(Wilbanks and Huang, 1975: 284).
In the analysis of the Family Assistance Plan's regional impact, 
the regional variation in family living costs is also important. The 
indexes of annual budgets at a lower level of living for a four-person 
family by state (as of Spring 1970) were calculated according to the 
formula shown below:
_ (CM X PM) 4- (CN X m )  
PM + PN
where IS = cost of living index for the state,
CM = cost of living index of state representative SMSA,
CN = cost of living index of regional nonmetropolitan 
areas (Northeast, North Central, South or West),
PM = percent of state population residing in the state 
representative SMSA, and
PN = percent of state population residing outside state SMSAs,
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If a state has more than one representative SMSA, the formula shown
below was used:
(CM, X PM,) + (CML X PM_) + . . . + (CM x  PM ) + (CN x  PN)1 1  I c n n
IS = ----------------------------  (4)
(PM^ + PMg + . . . + PM^ + PN)
where CM^ = cost of living index of first state representative SMSA,
CM^ = cost of living index of nth state representative SMSA,
PM^ = percent of state population residing in first state 
representative SMSA, and
PM = percent of state population residing in nth state 
^ representative SMSA.
If a state has no cost of living index for a representative SMSA, 
the average of the indexes (IS) of the surrounding states was used 
as the index of living costs for the SMSA areas of the state in 
question. The equation (5) was used in this instance.
(IS, + IS. + . . . + IS )
1 Z n
IS = [-----------------------------X PA] + (CN X PN) (5)n
where IS^ = state cost of living index in the first surrounding state, 
IS^ = state cost of living index in nth surrounding state, 
n = number of surrounding states,
PA = percent of state population residing in all SMSAs 
in the state,
CN = cost of living index for regional nonmetropolitan 
areas, and
PN = percent of state population residing outside 
state SMSAs.
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The data used in equations (3), (4), and (5) were drawn from a U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics publication (1972), and that of U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1971-1972).
In order to account for the inter-state variations in living 
costs in the United States, a modified version of the Family 
Assistance Plan was proposed (Wilbanks and Huang, 1975). Family 
assistance payments for residents in a county were adjusted to 
the living-cost index of the state in which the county in question 
is located.^
Measures of Income Inequality
In the present study, the analysis of income inequalities in
the United States includes four definitions of personal income:
personal income without public assistance payments, personal income
with public assistance payments, personal income under the Family
Assistance Plan (FAP), and personal income under the adjusted FAP
(according to the living-cost index). Comparisons were made of
the effectiveness of the present welfare programs (the Public
Assistance programs) and a proposed (FAP) welfare program in reducing
inter-and intra-state income inequalities in personal income without
2public assistance in the United States as of 1970. The study of
^A simple example of such a procedure would be to modify 
equation (2) so that A^ becomes:
Ay = AjV
where v = .01 (index of living costs).
2Due to the fact that the best available per capita income data 
for each county were for the year of 1969, the 1969 data were used to 
calculate that county’s 1970 income, assuming, little or no change in 
per capita income of that county in 1970.
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inter-state inequalities included all 50 states for the analysis. At 
the intra-state level, due to the number of counties involved (over 
3,000), a stratified random sample of fourteen states was selected; 
Idaho (ID), Louisiana (LA), Maryland (MD), Minnesota (MN), Mississippi 
(MS), Nebraska (NE), New Jersey (NJ), New Mexico (NM), Ohio (OH), 
Oklahoma (OK), Oregon (OR), Pennsylvania (PA), South Dakota (SD), and 
Wyoming (WY). States with less than 20 or more than 100 counties were 
excluded. The population was stratified by region and by income class 
(quintile). Statistics for population, personal per capita income, 
and public assistance payments for all 50 states and for all counties 
of the 14 chosen states were drawn from publication of the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census (1973),^
Three measures of income inequality were calculated for the total 
of four definitions of personal income in the United States. These 
measures include; 1) a weighted coefficient of variation (V^) ; 2) a 
modified information statistic (Z); and 3) a Gini Index (L).
1) Williamson (1965) suggested this weighted coefficient of
variation (V );
where f^ = population of the ith state (or county),
n = national (or state) population.
The best available public assistance payments data for each county 
were for February 1972. Thus, the 1972 yearly public assistance payments 
(payments for February multiplied by 12) for all 50 states and for all 
counties of the 14 chosen states were converted to 1970 dollar value by 
deflating by .927, taken from the Wholesale Price Index, assuming little 
or no difference in public assistance payments for states and counties 
in 1970 and in 1972.
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= per capita income of the ith state (or county), and
y  = national (or state) income per capita.
V ranges from 0 to 1. The smaller the coefficient, the less thew
degree of inequality.
2) An information statistic (Z), modified from the one used by 
Semple and Gauthier (1972), is listed below;
7 - I(Y) (7)
^ ■ log, N
Z ranges from 0 to 1. The smaller the Z, the less the degree of
inequality. Equation (7) is estimated by (8) and (9):
I(Y) = logg N - H(Y) (8)
where I(Y) = a measure of inequality,
N = number of states (or counties), and 
H(Y) = the entropy, estimated by (9)
N
H(Y) = H  Y. log, (9)
i=l ^  ̂%
where Y. = proportion of national (or state) income in a given state 
(or county). Here, per capita income figures were used. 
The national total is estimated by multiplying the 
national income per capita by the number of states in 
the nation (50).
3) The Gini Index (L) is a measure of income concentration
which ranges from 0 to 1. The smaller the index, the less the amount
of concentration. The form used by Miller (1971) is:
L.. w  ' E
10000
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where n = number of states (or counties),
= proportion of total national population (or state population) 
in a given state (or county),
= cumulative proportion of total national population (or state 
population) in the states i and i+1 (or counties i and 
1+1),
= proportion of total national income (or state income) in a 
given state (or county), and
= cumulative proportion of total national income (or state 
income) in the states i and i+1 (or counties i and i+1).
The use of more than one measure of income inequality for the
study of the FAP and the present welfare system indicates the existence
of some drawbacks associated with individual measures and the need for
a more objective and comparative interpretation of the results. The
Williamson coefficient of variation is particularly sensitive to the
extreme cases, because of the squaring of the (y^ - y). The use of
the information statistic and the Gini Index measures is intended to
overcome such problems. But the information statistic and the Gini
Index measures are not themselves devoid of problems. Both seem to
be sensitive to the size of the sample, i.e., the smaller the sample
size, the lower tends to be the level of inequality. For the
information statistic measure, this drawback is attributable to the
fact that the smaller the sample size (number of states or counties),
the greater is the H(Y), hence the smaller I(Y), the measure of
inequality. For the Gini Index measure, the smaller the sample size,
n n
the smaller tends to be the value of the ( ^ f.y.,_ - ^  f^.iY.),f—; I''1+1 f— r i+l‘'ii=l 1=1
hence the smaller is L, the measure of concentration.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Regional Patterns of Benefits of 
the Family Assistance Plan
In terms of the total projected FAP income of $16.2 billion 
(excluding Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington, 
D.C.), the five most populous states (New York, California, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, and Illinois) stand out as major recipients of the 
plan (Table 11). These states, constituting 35.5 percent of the U.S. 
population (as of 1970), would receive 33.5 percent of the total FAP 
payments. This figure indicates that a significant portion of total 
FAP recipients would be found in these most populous and economically 
advanced areas even though they would receive slightly less than their 
proportion of the total U.S. population might warrant. The Southern 
states, including Texas, would receive 41 percent of the total 
projected payments. Since the Southern states made up only 30.5 
percent of the total U.S. population in 1970, they would receive a 
larger share of FAP revenues.
The geographical variations in per capita FAP income show that 
the entire South (except Maryland and Delaware), some North Central 
states (North and South Dakota), and some Mountain states (New Mexico 
and Arizona) represent the higher values. The highest value centers 
on Mississippi (Table 11 and Figure 2), These high values indicate 
that the poor families represent a large proportion of the total 
population in these relatively poor and underdeveloped areas of the 
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fits with ! 
Cost Adjus
Alabama $453792000 $131.75 88.55 $123.91
Alaska 17036928 56.71 155.00 69.97
Arizona 155249328 87.66 102.54 88.98
Arkansas 292754688 152.21 88.94 145.74
California 1404037888 70.36 106.86 71.71
Colorado 157993664 71.57 97.35 70.85
Connecticut 149352928 49.26 103.23 49.68
Delaware 33094304 60.37 95.91 59.89
Florida 610819328 89.96 88.99 85.83
Georgia 493388032 107.50 89.50 101.16
Hawaii 43890736 57.10 119.66 58.51
Idaho 58997968 82.79 100.51 83.00
Illinois 693595904 62.40 102.21 63.39
Indiana 264128880 50.85 99.69 50.79
Iowa 203975792 72.21 97.17 71.21
Kansas 174188176 77.53 97.58 76.55
Kentucky 418368768 129.98 88.81 124.26
Louisiana 495863040 136.17 88.60 127.27
Maine 82123056 82,78 96.93 81.93
Maryland 220086448 56.11 99.86 56.07
Massachusetts 316421632 55.61 103.60 56.16
Michigan 519546624 58,53 99.01 58.41
Minnesota 271090944 71.24 100.15 71.28
Mississippi 380350976 171.56 88.10 160,79
Missouri 398020864 85.11 98.84 84.62
Montana 53555728 77,12 99.69 77.03
Nebraska 112351744 75.73 97.51 74.98
Nevada 23833952 48.76 105.54 49.85
New Hampshire 40482912 54.87 96.77 54,06
New Jersey 434765568 60.65 100.17 60,69
New Mexico 126647840 124.65 97,82 123.18
New York 1429529856 78.38 101.71 78,70
North Carolina 556587776 109.52 88.51 104,24
North Dakota 63707408 103.12 97.21 101.97
Ohio 601233408 56.44 98.14 56.16
Oklahoma 290852096 113.64 90.31 109.50
Oregon 142364016 68.07 103.65 69.25
Pennsylvania 824487168 69.90 97.71 69.44
Rhode Island 63270624 66.83 102.28 67.45
South Carolina 299554560 115.63 88.40 109.94
South Dakota 74706736 112.25 97.25 111.00
Tennessee 475835648 121.27 88.64 116.54
(TABLE 11 continued.)
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Texas 1090392576 97.38 91.32 93.28
Utah 66374832 62.66 101.41 62.93
Vermont 33552896 75.51 96.00 74.36
Virginia 407898112 87.74 93.40 85.23
Washington 211959376 62.17 105.51 63.99
West Virginia 221126512 126.77 90.38 122.17
Wisconsin 262909280 59.51 99.05 59.31
Wyoming 22358240 67.25 100.00 67.25
Source: Author's estimates.
FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN PAYMENTS, PER CAPITA
NUMBER OF DOLLARS
48 76 -  66 29
66 30 -  83 84
83 85 -  10138
iS 10139 -  11892
300
118 93 -  136 46
miles
100 136 4 7 -  154 01
300 miles




New Mexico and Arizona would benefit more from the Family Assistance 
Plan than the rest of the states. When regional differentiation in 
living costs^ (Table 11) is considered, the South would benefit still 
more from the plan than would the remaining states. The FAP benefits 
of the Northeastern states (except for Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
and Pennsylvania), Pacific states, some Mountain states (Nevada,
Arizona, Utah, and Idaho), Hawaii, and Alaska would be adversely 
affected by the higher living costs in these areas.
Also, there is an inverse relationship (r = -.55) between the 
cost of living and the level of FAP payments per capita (Table 11).
It is clear that not only do more expensive places receive less 
benefits, but also a payment dollar buys less there. This magnifies 
whatever effects are associated with the variations in payment levels 
(Wilbanks and Huang, 1975).
In order to eliminate or reduce regional variations in FAP benefits, 
the proposed Family Assistance payments should be adjusted to the cost 
of living in the various geographical locations. The consequence of 
such adjustment is a reduction in regional variations in payment levels 
per capita (Table 11) with the standard deviation of payment levels 
from the mean state value changing from 29.5 to 26.8. This reduction 
in regional variations in per capita FAP benefits might improve the 
prospects of the plan for approval by Congress (Wilbanks and Huang,
1975).
^Estimates of average living costs were interpolated from cost 
of living data for multi-state regions and selected cities (see pp. 
62-64
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The estimated regional gross and per capita FAP payments in 
the present study have been compared to that of a recent study of 
the Family Assistance Plan (Golladay and Haveman, 1977). Their 
study shows that for the year 1973 the gross FAP payments for all 
50 states and Washington, D.C. would be about $3,33 .billion.
Although their figure is too conservative, its regional distribution 
is quite similar to that of the present study (Table 12). A corre­
lation test indicates a correlation coefficient of .47 between the 
regional distribution of gross FAP payments of the two studies.
When the regional distribution of the per family FAP payments of 
the Golladay and Haveman study is compared to that of the per capita 
FAP payments of the present study, the correlation increases to .81.
The Regional Patterns of Political Support 
for the Family Assistance Plan
It would be rational to assume that the political support for 
the Family Assistance Plan would coincide with the patterns of the 
plan's benefits, because the benefits, in the form of cash payments, 
would presumably improve the quality of life of local residents and 
stimulate the local economy (Bonner, 1971ajand Kain and Schafer, 1971). 
The 1971 vote for the plan in the House of Representatives (Table 13) 
was mapped (Figure 3). The Senate vote (October 4, 1972) on the 
Stevenson Amendment (Table 14) to an alternative plan was also mapped 
(Figure 4). Votes against tabling the amendment were considered to 
be in support of the Family Assistance Plan. Thus, it is interesting 
to note that those states which would receive higher levels of per 
capita FAP payments turned out to be the major opponents of the plan.
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TABLE 12
PATTERNS OF REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FAP 
BENEFITS ESTIMATED BY CTO STUDIES
Region
Gross Benefits (in 
Millions)






RI, VT 125.1 684.0 $32.84 $57.76
2) NY 41.3 1430.0 6.94 78.38
3) PA,NJ 176.1 1259.0 28.05 66.40
4) OH,MI 111.0 1121.0 17.38 57.41
5) IN,IL 203.7 958.0 37.37 58.75
6) WI,MN 108.9 534.0 37.43 64.94
7) IA,MO 129.5 602.0 58.37 80.26
8) KS,NB,ND,SD 107.0 425.0 73.44 84.77
9) DE,DC,MD 53.6 253.0 30.16 56.59
10) VA,WV 101.5 629.0 59.18 98.39
11) NO 127.3 557.0 81.12 109.52
12) SC 91.1 300.0 106.61 115.63
13) GA 42.3 493:0 28.76 107.50
14) FL 129.1 611.0 55.76 89.96
15) KY,TN 163.1 894.0 74.96 125.17
16) AL 112.9 454.0 112.38 131.75
17) MS 225.2 380.0 276.53 171.56
18) AR,OK 83.4 584.0 66.05 130.28
19) LA 176.3 496.0 137.96 136.17
20) TX 248.4 1090.0 72,32 97.38
21) AZ,CO,ID,NM, 
AK,UT,NV,WY,MT 194.7 682.0 72.44 79.47
22) WA,OR,HI 90.9 398.0 42.66 63.49
23) CA 488.3 1404.0 68.76 70.36
U.S. 3330.4 16238.0
Source: Golladay and Haveman,1977, pp. 60-61, and the author's calculations.
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TABLE 13
HOUSE VOTE ON PASSAGE OF H 1, INCLUDING THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN, 
1971 (YES-VOTE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE BY STATE)
State % Yes-Vote State % Yes-Vote
Alabama 37.50 Montana 100.00
Alaska 100.00 Nebraska 66.65
Arizona 66.65 Nevada 0.0
Arkansas 100.00 New Hamnshire 0.0
California 78.94 New Jersey 93.33
Colorado 75.00 New Mexico 0.0
Connecticut 100.00 New York 75.60
Delaware 100.00 North Carolina 18.18
Florida 25.00 North Dakota 100.00
Georgia 30.00 Ohio 66.65
Hawaii 100.00 Oklahoma 33.33
Idaho 50.00 Oregon 75.00
Illinois .91.66 Pennsylvania 76.92
Indiana 72.72 Rhode Island 100.00
Iowa 57.14 South Carolina 16.66
Kansas 80.00 South Dakota 50.00
Kentucky 71.42 Tennessee 55.55
Louisiana 12.50 Texas 39.13
Maine 100.00 Utah 100.00
Maryland 50.00 Vermont 100.00
Massachusetts 91.66 Virginia 30.00
Michigan 84.21 Washington 100.00
Minnesota 87.50 West Virginia 80.00
Mississippi 0.0 Wisconsin 100.00
Missouri 50.00 Wyoming 100.00
Source: Calculated from data drawn from Congressional Index, 1971-1972,
p. 5284.
1
FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN, HOUSE VOTE, 1971
(My
G\
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES 
I I 0.0  -  33.33
33.34 -  66 66




FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN, SENATE VOTE AGAINST MODIFYING AMENDMENT, 
1972 (YES-VOTE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE BY STATE)
State % Yes-Vote State % Yes-Vote
Alabama 0.0 Montana 0.0
Alaska 50.0 Nebraska 0.0
Arizona 0.0 Nevada 0.0
Arkansas 0.0 New Hampshire 0.0
California 100.0 New Jersey 100.0
Colorado 0.0 New Mexico 50.0
Connecticut 50.0 New York 50.0
Delaware 0.0 North Carolina 0.0
Florida 0.0 North Dakota 0.0
Georgia 0.0 Ohio 100.0
Hawaii 0.0 Oklahoma 0.0
Idaho 0.0 Oregon 0.0
Illinois 100.0 Pennsylvania 100.0
Indiana 100.0 Rhode Island 50.0
Iowa 50.0 South Carolina 0.0
Kansas 0.0 South Dakota 0.0
Kentucky 100.0 Tennessee 0.0
Louisiana 0.0 Texas 0.0
Maine 50.0 Utah 50.0
Maryland 100.0 Vermont 100.0
Massachusetts 50.0 Virginia 0.0
Michigan 100.0 Washington 50.0
Minnesota 100.0 West Virginia 0.0
Mississippi 0.0 Wisconsin 50.0
Missouri 100.0 Wyoming 0.0
Source; Calculated from data drawn from Congressional Index, 1971-1972,
p. 5545.
FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN, SENATE VOTE










wbeveas gtates receiving less per capita FAP payments showed the 
strongest support for the plan (Figures 2, 3, and 4). Since the 
distinction between support for and opposition to the FAP was less 
clear in the Senate vote, only House vote (divided into two classes: 
states for the plan, and states against) was used to determine the 
relationship between the patterns of support (or opposition) for 
the plan and the patterns of FAP benefits. A Mann-Whitney U test 
indicated that they were inversely related and the relationship 
was significant at the level of ,001 (Wilbanks and Huang, 1975).
The patterns of support for the plan seem to suggest regional 
differences in the prevailing attitude toward federal welfare activity, 
concerns in the South about the stability of political power and sensi­
tivity in parts of the urban North about possible fiscal burdens from 
regional in-migration. But in view of the size of the potential boost 
to local economies in the South from externally-derived payments plus 
a multiplier, the Southern representatives may be relying on a lack 
of information among their constituents about the magnitude of economic 
benefits to keep them out of political trouble at home (Wilbanks and 
Huang, 1975).
Impact of the Family Assistance Plan on 
Inter-state Income Inequalities
The three measures of income inequality in the United States in 
1970 reveal quite different pictures at the inter-state and intra­
state levels. At the inter-state level, the present welfare system 
has caused a slight increase in income inequalities between states, 
ranging from 1.6 to 4,5 percent with different measures (Table 15 and
16). Since the present welfare system includes various federal.
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TABLE 15
IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON INTER-STATE INCOME 









Assistance .1403 .0464 .0552
With Public 
Assistance .1426 .0485 .0574
Under FAP .1302 .0441 .0521
Under Adjusted 




IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON INTER-STATE INCOME INEQUALITIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 (PERCENT CHANGE FROM INEQUALITIES 









Assistance +  1.6 % + 4.5 % + 3.9 %
Under FAP - 7.2 - 5.0 - 5.7
Under Adjusted
FAP — 6.6 — 4.6 - 4.9
Source: Author's computations.
+ Inequalities increase. 
- Inequalities decrease.
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state, and local welfare programs, the slight increase in between- 
state income inequalities under the present welfare system may be 
attributed to inter-state discrepancies in welfare policies, gener­
osity, eligibility, and discrimination (Orr, 1976: 359; Barth,
Carcagno, and Palmer, 1974: 31; and Wohlenberg, 1976). Wealthier 
states tend to be more generous, less restrictive, and more equitable 
in their welfare programs.
The proposed Family Assistance Plan would reduce the inter-state 
inequalities by 5 to 7.2 percent, depending on the measure of inequal­
ity (Table 16), but its effectiveness would be greater (about a 9 
percent reduction in inequalities) if compared to the income inequal­
ities under the present welfare system (Table 17). The adjusted 
Family Assistance Plan would be almost as effective in reducing inter­
state inequalities as the Family Assistance Plan. The adjustment for 
inter-state variations in living costs would increase the plan's 
equity, but reduce its effectiveness very slightly (Tables 15, 16, and
17).
Impact of the Family Assistance Plan on 
Intra-state Income Inequalities
The effectiveness of the present welfare system in reducing income 
inequalities within individual states (the chosen fourteen states) varies 
noticeably. It reduces inequalities in some states (New Jersey, Oklahoma, 
New Mexico, South Dakota, Louisiana, and Mississippi), while it increases 
or makes no difference in other states (Wyoming, Maryland, Oregon, Idaho, 
Nebraska, Ohio, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania) (Table 18). The changes 
range from an 8 percent increase to a 6.5 percent decrease in inequality. 
The effectiveness of the present welfare system in reducing income
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TABLE 17
IMPACT OF FAP AND ADJUSTED FAP ON INTER-STATE INCOME INEQUALI­
TIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970 (PERCENT CHANGE FROM INEQUALITIES IN 
1970 PERSONAL INCOME UNDER THE PRESENT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE SYSTEM).
Williamson Information Gini
Coefficient Statistic Index
Under FAP - 8.7 % - 9.1 % - 9.3 %





IMPACT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON INTRA-STATE INCOME INEQUALITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970
New Jersey (21 Counties) Idaho (44 Counties)
Without 
P. A.










Maryland (24 Counties) New Mexico (32 Counties)
Without 
P. A.








Oregon (36 Counties) South Dakota (67 Counties)
Without 
P. A.








Wyoming (23 Counties) Louisiana (64 Counties)
Without 
P. A.








Oklahoma (77 Counties) Mississippi (82 Counties)
Without 
P. A.








Nebraska (93 Counties) Minnesota (87 Counties)
Without 
P. A.








Ohio (88 Counties) Pennsylvania (67 Counties)
Without P.A .1240 











V = Williamson Coefficient, Z = Information Statistic,
W
L = Gini Index.
P. A. stands for Public Assistance.
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inequalities seems to increase slightly at the intra-state level.
The proposed Family Assistance Plan would reduce within-state 
inequalities in all 14 states (Tables 19, 20, and 21). The magnitude 
of this reduction varies between states. There tends to be an inverse 
relationship between the FAP’s effectiveness and the degree of affluence 
of the given states (Figures 5, 6, and 7). For example, the FAP would 
reduce inequalities by over 15 percent in the poorest state, Mississippi, 
while reduce only 1 to 4.7 percent, depending on the index, in the 
richest state, New Jersey.
The analysis of the FAP's effectiveness in reducing within-state 
income inequalities includes three comparisons, namely geographical 
location, urban-rural character, and economic structure. The inclusion 
of these components might contribute to our understanding of the ef­
fectiveness of the present and future welfare programs in reducing 
spatial variations in income inequality.
Geographical Location
All 50 states of the United States were divided, according to the 
classification scheme of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, into four broad 
geographical regions: Northeast, North Central, South, and West. The 
selected 14 states include 3 Northeastern states^, 3 Southern states,
4 North Central states, and 4 Western states.
The regional variations in the effectiveness of using FAP to 
reduce intra-state income inequalities are apparent in the results 
from three measures of income inequality (Figures 8, 9, and 10).
Due to its adjacent location and close ties with Northeastern 
states, Maryland is considered a Northeastern state here rather than 
a Southern state as is in the Bureau of Census classification.
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TABLE 19
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 
INEQUALITIES WITHIN SELECTED STATES, 1970, 
WILLIAMSON COEFFICIENT.
NJ MD OH OR PA MN WY NE OK ID NM SD LA MS
State 
Per Capita
Income $3674 3512 3199 3148 3066 3038 2895 2797 2694 2644 2437 2387 2330 192 
% Decline in
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FIGURE 5
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 





IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 
INEQUALITIES WITHIN SELECTED STATES, 1970, 
INFORMATION STATISTIC.
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State 
Per Capita
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FIGURE 6
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 





IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 
INEQUALITIES WITHIN SELECTED STATES, 1970,
GINI INDEX.
N J MD OH OR PA MN WY NE OK ID NM SD LA MS
State 
Per Capita
Income $3674 3512 3199 3148 3066 3038 2895 2797 2694 2644 2437 2387 2330 192 
% Decline in
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FIGURE 7
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 
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FIGURE 9
GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 
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FIGURE 10
GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
IMPACT OF THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN ON PRESENT INCOME 







10 LA NE PA






Affluence (Per Capita Income)
$4000
93
The FAP would be more effective in reducing intra-state inequalities 
in the South and North Central, while less effective in the West and 
Northeast. Since Northeast and West are relatively more developed 
regions, Williamson (1965) believes that in these regions there is 
likely a tendency toward convergence in personal incomes, hence a 
lower degree of income inequalities and the less effective of using 
an income maintenance program to reduce intra-state income inequalities.
The geographical variations in FAP’s effectiveness, as represented 
by Figures 8, 9, and 10, can be better illustrated by a simplified 
graph (Figure 11). On this graph, the FAP is most effective in reducing 
intra-state inequalities in the South, followed by the North Central, 
the West, and the Northeast in descending order. The inverse relation­
ship between the plan's effectiveness and the degree of affluence of 
individual states also varies between regions. The South has the 
steepest inverse relationship between the plan's effectiveness and 
state affluence, followed by the North Central and the West with a 
less steep inverse relationship, and the Northeast with the least steep 
inverse relationship.
An interesting finding is that the selected North Central states, 
except South Dakota, have higher per capita personal Income (affluence) 
than most of the selected Western states, but the FAP is more effective 
in reducing inequality in the former than in the latter region. This 
inconsistency may be explained by the fact that the North Central has 
a higher degree of variance in its average per capita income due to 
much greater differences in personal income between its well industri­
alized urban areas and its relatively underdeveloped agricultural 
rural areas than is the case in the West (Williamson, 1965, Table 4a).
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FIGURE 11
GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 










It is believed that the most severe problems of poverty and the 
greatest degree of income inequalities occur in the rural regions of 
a country. In these regions, the economic base is usually under­
developed and less diverse. The underdevelopment and lack of 
diversification often lead to a large amount of underemployment 
and unemployment in the labor force. The consequence is a poverty- 
stricken region with regional average income much lower than the 
national average and an extremely high rate of unemployment. Also, 
in these regions, there is a high degree of concentration of personal 
as well as corporate wealth. Therefore, it can be argued that in 
these rural regions not only is an income maintenance program highly 
desirable, but also most effective.
Since there is no consensus concerning how to classify states 
into urban or rural groupings, this dichotomy will not be attempted 
in this study. In order to test the hypothesis that an income 
maintenance program would be more effective in reducing inequality 
in rural areas, the relationship between the percent of state 
population in urban areas for the fourteen chosen states and the 
decline in income inequality caused by FAP in these states has 
to be determined. The proportions of state population residing in 
the urban areas in 1970 for these fourteen states were drawn from 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1971-1972). Figures 12, 13, and 14 show 
that there is an inverse relationship between the percent of state 
population residing in urban areas and the decline in income 
inequality caused by FAP. A Spearman's rank-order correlation test 



















































residing in urban areas and the percent of decline in inequality 
caused by the FAP are -.79, -.42, and -.67, depending on the measure. 
These results tend to suggest that an income maintenance program 
would be more effective in reducing income inequalities in the rural 
areas than in the urban areas.
Economic Structure
The economic structure of a region usually reflects the level 
of industrial development and degree of complexity of its economy. 
According to Williamson (1965), the more industrialized and complex 
its economy, the more affluent and equitable is the region. It can 
then be assumed that the higher the percent of state total income 
derived from agriculture, the more effective is an income maintenance 
program in reducing income inequalities. The percent of state total 
income derived from agriculture in 1971 for each of the fourteen 
states was drawn from publication of the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (1974). An examination of the percent of state income derived 
from agriculture for the fourteen states and the decline in income 
inequalities caused by the FAP in these states indicates that there 
is a strong positive relationship between them (Figures 15, 16, and 
17). A Spearman's rank-order correlation test shows that the corre­
lations are .79, .48, and .67, for different measures. These 
correlations tend to suggest that an income maintenance program is 
likely to be more effective in reducing income inequalities in regions 
or states highly dominated by agriculture as their major economic base. 
Such regions or states usually have higher percent of their population 
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Comparison of Three Measures of Income Inequality
Among the three measures of Income Inequality, the Williamson 
coefficient and the Glnl Index offered similar results whereas the 
Information statistic produced results less similar to that of the 
other two measures. The similarity between results of the Williamson 
coefficient and Glnl Index Is Illustrated In Figure 18 and the greater 
difference between results of the Williamson coefficient and Information 
statistic In Figure 19. The more different results produced by the 
Information statistic measure perhaps can be explained by the fact 
that total national (or state) income is estimated by multiplying the 
national (or state) Income per capita by the number of states (or 
counties) In the nation (or state). The gross national (or state) 
and state (or county) Income figures would fit the information statistic 
measure better than would the per capita Income figures. Since the 
Williamson coefficient Is a measure of per capita income inequality both 
between and within states and the Glnl Index a measure of Income inequal­
ity weighted by the population, the per capita income figures become 
the only adequate data for the Information statistic measure. If the 
results of the three measures are to be compared with one another.
In terms of computational simplicity, the Williamson coefficient 
Is the most desirable measure of income inequality. Although the Glnl 
Index measure produced similar results to that of the Williamson 
measure. Its computational complexity may offset some of its advantages. 
But the results of the Gini Index measure can be easily utilized for 
the Lorenz curve analysis which would illustrate the distribution of 
cumulative incomes between and within states (Alker, 1965: 36-42).
The comparisons between results of all three measures of Income
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FIGURE 18
COMPARISON BETWEEN RESULTS OF THE WILLIAMSON COEFFICIENT 
MEASURE AND THE GINI INDEX MEASURE
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FIGURE 19
COMPARISON BETWEEN RESULTS OF THE WILLIAMSON COEFFICIENT MEASURE 
AND THE INFORMATION STATISTIC MEASURE
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inequality show anomalies, i.e., differences in the effectiveness of 
the FAP in reducing income inequalities in the same state if different 
measures were used. These states include Maryland, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and, to a lesser extent. New Jersey and New Mexico.
There are no readily clear explanations for these anomalies encountered 
in the analysis. These states include both rich and poor states, states 
with a large number of counties and with a small number of counties, and 
states of large population and of small population. These anomalies in 
the results of different measures may warrant future research in this 
area.
This comparison of the results of the three measures of inequality 
also reveals that the state of income inequality is much greater for 
the Williamson measure while that for the other two measures are 
considerably smaller and often quite similar to each other. This 
phenomenon perhaps can be explained by the reason suggested in Chapter 
IV, i.e., the squaring of the differences between the state (or county) 
and national (or state) per capita income figures. For the results of 
the other two measures, the levels of income inequality tend to be low 
for states with a small number of counties. Among the three measures 
of inequality, the information statistic measure is most sensitive 
to sample size.
Thus, any one attempting to identify and describe the levels of 
income inequality in a particular country or region at a given time 
should be aware of the inherent differences among various measures of 
income inequality. However, for the purpose of gauging the effects 
of the welfare reform plans on the changes in the levels of income 
inequality, the absolute levels of income inequality are less
107
important than the relative changes in the level of inequality both 
before and after the welfare reform plans came into effect.
CHAPTER VI
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN
The impacts of various income maintenance programs, including 
the Family Assistance Plan, would have some direct and indirect 
implications for regional economic development. Some of the economic 
and social impacts of various income maintenance programs have been 
discussed in Chapter III, especially labor supply. The present 
chapter deals mainly with the effects of various income maintenance 
programs, including the Family Assistance Plan, on regional economic 
development. The development process in a regional context includes 
inter-and intra-regional migration as well as aspects of labor supply 
and structural economic relationships, which were discussed in Chapter 
III. These factors are drawn together in this chapter.
Impact on Regional Migration 
Although an income maintenance program may not be designed to 
affect migration, the program may still inadvertently affect migration 
through its impact on the costs and benefits of geographical mobility. 
Since migration can be viewed as a productive investment in the migrant, 
such investment involves costs and yields returns over a time period.
The costs of migration include direct costs, opportunity costs, infor­
mation costs, decreases in the value of non-transferable assets (such 
as seniority in one’s job), and psychic costs. The returns to migration 
are in the form of changes in earnings, in non-employment income (such 
as welfare payments), and in non-pecuniary benefits. The rate of
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return on the migration investment is often determined by the net 
results of combining these costs and benefits. Thus, many economists 
believe that a person, or family, will invest in migration if the 
marginal rate of return exceeds the marginal cost of financing the 
investment (DaVanzo, 1972 and 1973).
In general, an income maintenance program would facilitate the 
financing of migration through its guaranteed income supplements. Such 
income supplements to the recipients regardless of their geographical 
location would also reduce considerably the opportunity costs associated 
with migration. Furthermore, the assured income supplements for the 
eligible potential migrant in the new location, his destination, will 
reduce the riskiness of investing in migration, for the expected loss 
from being unemployed after moving is now reduced. If other determinants 
of migration can be held constant, such program induced reductions in 
costs and uncertainties of migration may lead to an increased flow of 
migrants.
Income maintenance programs with high marginal tax rates on 
earnings, such as the FAP, will reduce potential net earnings (i.e., 
after tax) in all locations and thus decrease the earnings differential 
available by migrating. Such effect would reduce the incentive to 
search for and migrate for better employment opportunities (DaVanzo,
1973). This reduced economic incentive to migrate may alter present 
inter-and intra-regional migration in the United States to the extent 
that most of those poor potential migrants from the Southern and 
Midwestern states seeking better employment opportunities in other 
regions may be persuaded to remain in their home states. Also, a 
federally administered income maintenance program, such as the FAP,
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is likely to reduce interstate welfare discrepancies and thus dis­
courages persons migrating to areas with higher welfare benefits or 
more liberal eligibility requirements under the present welfare 
system.^ The end result would be a reduced rate of out-migration 
from the South and Midwest and from the rural areas»
Kain and Schafer (1971) used a modification of the Bowles (1970) 
model of migration to evaluate the potential impact of various FAPs 
on U.S. interregional migration patterns. They found that FAP would 
have a modest impact on migration between the South and the non-South. 
Their findings suggest that the impact of FAP would be substantially 
larger on white net-migration than on black net-migration. It would 
reduce the black migration from the South to other regions (especially 
the Northern metropolitan areas) by about 2 percent annually, while 
increasing white net in-migration from about 4 to 9 percent annually. 
The increased white net in-migration rates are in part explained by 
FAP’s discouraging effect on the out-migration of Southern whites 
(Kain and Schafer, 1971: 75 and 80). Kain and Schafer’s estimates 
of FAP’s impact on Southern black out-migration seem somewhat lower 
than what would be expected and future studies might yield different 
results.
If national income maintenance programs offer uniform payments 
to the eligible recipients regardless of their geographical locations 
and their differences in living costs, such as the FAP, these programs 
would encourage and increase the flow of migrants to areas where their
A recent empirical study of the interregional migration of the 
poor in the United States found that in the 1965-1970 period the poor 
did migrate toward areas with higher welfare payments (Glantz, 1973: 76).
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real incomes or consumption returns would increase. Areas with very 
low living costs, with pleasant climates, with friends and relatives, 
or with better amenities are likely to receive increased flows of 
migrants if a national income maintenance program of this nature is 
instituted. In the United States, such a plan would not only reduce 
the out-migration flows of the poor from the South and Midwest and 
from the rural areas, but also might reinforce the current new trend 
of reverse migration,i.e., from the non-South to the South, and from 
the urban to non-urban areas (Roseman, 1977).
The migration of the poor under a national income maintenance 
program may be conditioned by the age factor of the potential migrants. 
Bonner (1971b) suggests that migration of the poor will become a more 
dichotomous phenomenon under the FAP. Among poor young adults, mi­
gration should increase and their movement should be more responsive 
to differences in economic opportunity (less sensitive to high marginal 
tax rates on earnings) as well as in social amenities. Among the 
remaining poor, the opposite will be true. In general, metropolitan 
areas provide more economic opportunities and better amenities than 
nonmetropolitan areas. Therefore, there will be a relative concentra­
tion of the young poor in metropolitan areas and a corresponding 
concentration of the remaining poor in the nonmetropolitan areas.
However, the net result of these changes expected by Bonner (1971b) 
is not certain. It is possible that many old or middle-aged poor with 
dependent children will also migrate to metropolitan areas where it 
is usually difficult for them to find jobs to support themselves or 
their families. With the Family Assistance payments, the need for 
employment to gain subsistance is no longer vital. They can leave the
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backward rural areas and seek the amenities of the urban areas. But 
this rural to urban migration of the poor, young or otherwise, under 
the FAP probably will only occur in the poor regions since their 
major urban centers are still small in size relative to that of the 
rich regions. The in-migration of the poor to the urban centers of 
the poor regions may yet help them to realize the economies of scale 
in the provision of urban services. The major urban centers of the 
more developed rich regions are so large in size that the diseconomies 
of scale have probably already set in motion (Hansen, 1973; 160). The 
in-migration of the poor to these centers will be discouraged by the 
rapidly increasing costs and inconvenience, such as traffic congestion, 
pollution, and crimes associated with living there.
Thus, under the FAP, it is reasonable to suggest that overall 
interstate migration by the poor will decline (especially from the 
South to other regions) while that by the non-poor will increase 
(to the less developed poor regions, such as the South). At the 
intrastate level, the rural to urban migration will increase in the 
poor regions while the reverse migration (from urban to rural) will 
take place or increase in the rich regions. The intermediate-sized 
urban centers in the poor regions are likely to be the destination of 
the poor migrants of these regions, while rural areas near the major 
metropolitan centers in the rich regions will draw people away from 
these large urban centers (Hansen, 1973).
Due to the complexity of possible effects of income maintenance 
programs on migration, existing empirical studies of migration are 
of little help in enabling policy-makers to determine the effects an 
income maintenance program might have on population redistribution
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(DaVanzo, 1972; and DaVanzo and Greenberg, 1974). A comparison of 
the similarities and differences between several important empirical 
studies of migration in the United States has been made by DaVanzo 
(1972, Appendix C), Most of the current empirical studies of 
migration are theoretically inadequate and the data used are often 
inappropriate. Many migration models, such as those of Sjaastad (1962), 
Schwartz (1968), Bowles (1970), and O'Neill (1970), tend to overlook 
an Important factor of migration that for married persons the 
decision-making unit is the family rather than the individual; the 
wife's employment opportunities affect the husband's migration decision, 
and vice versa. A wider range of demographic groups, such as women and 
nonwhites, had until recently been excluded in most migration models. 
Most of the explanatory variables used in various models tend to be 
economic-incentive oriented (Silvers, 1977). Many important non­
economic determinants of migration, such as good climate, social and 
cultural amenities, and psychic benefits, have been included in some of 
the recent migration studies, but the focus of these studies rarely 
goes beyond examining the determinants of migration per se. Almost all 
of the literature dealing with the determinants of migration is devoid 
of direct policy implications (Greenwood, 1975: 421). Thus, Greenwood 
(1975) argues for the development and utilization of the simultaneous- 
equation models of migration, so that policy variables can be explicitly 
introduced into the models to estimate and demonstrate the impacts of 
policy decisions on migration.
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Impact on Regional Economic Growth
The most important and yet least understood issue of income 
maintenance programs is their potential impacts on economic growth, 
national as well as subnational. At the national level, most economists 
believe that there is a trade-off, or opportunity costs, between econom­
ic growth and income redistribution (income maintenance programs are 
one of many policy means to redistribute income). But such a trade-off 
may be politically desirable and imperative (Kuznets, 1955). An inher­
ent assumption associated with this type of argument is that economic 
growth or development always precedes and is a pre-condition of income 
redistribution. However, some economists, such as Seers (1970), and 
Higgins (1973), argue that efforts to redistribute income and to 
reduce regional gap are essential part of the basic development thrust, 
for their influences to accelerate growth, reduce unemployment, and 
maintain price stability. The present study adopts this type of 
reasoning in the analysis of the potential impacts of income maintenance 
on economic growth (Figure 20).
At the subnational level, a question arises concerning how would an 
income maintenance program, through its redistribution of income, affect 
the economic growth of individual regions. Would the economic growth 
of the poor regions be stimulated by the transfer payments at the 
expense of the rich regions, or vice versa? The answers to these ques­
tions will be the main focus of this section.
In general, income maintenance programs would affect economic 
growth directly through their effects on savings, consumption, imports, 
economies of scale, and factor utilization; and indirectly through 
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The Issue of savings Is linked to the considerations of capital 
formation which Is one of the major determinants of economic growth. 
Economists, such as W. Arthur Lewis (1954), Galenson and Lelbensteln 
(1955), argue that entrepreneurial profit Is the major source of 
savings, because the profit recipients save a higher portion of their 
Income than wage recipients do.^ But other economists. Including 
Keynes, Friedman (1957), Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and Cline 
(1972), believe that the savings rate Is more related to the level 
of personal income than to the type of personal Income. This argument 
Is theoretically more convincing, since there Is a high correlation 
between entrepreneurial Income and upper Income level. If we accept 
this argument that the savings rate Is a function of the personal 
Income level, how would an Income maintenance program affect aggregate 
savings behavior? If an Income maintenance program Is financed through 
means other than increased taxation. It would have no, or very 
Insignificant, impact on the overall savings behavior, since the 
higher Income groups will not be adversely affected by the program 
and the Increased incomes from the program for the lower Income groups 
will only be spent for various consumer items rather than be saved by 
these groups. If an Income maintenance program Is financed through 
Increased taxation, such as the FAP, the effect of the program on 
aggregate savings Is likely to be negative, since there will be no 
Increase In savings for the lower Income groups while a decreased 
rate of savings is likely to occur among the higher Income groups.
Estimates of an empirical study by H. S. Houthakker (1961) 
tend to support the hypothesis that the propensity to save for 
entrepreneurial income is greater than that for labor Income.
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The magnitude of such a negative impact on savings is, however, still 
not clear, perhaps depending upon the extent the high income groups’ 
income will be affected by the program’s financing and their income 
elasticity of savings.
Cline (.1972), in a simulation study, estimated the potential 
effects of income redistribution on economic growth for several Latin 
American countries. His calculations of the savings effect of income 
redistribution show that attainment of the level of income equity 
found in Britain would cause decreases in the growth rate (due to the 
reduction in savings) on the order of 1 percent annually in Brazil 
and Mexico, 0.66 percent in Argentina, and no decrease in Venezuela. 
Since these figures were estimated for less developed countries, it 
would be reasonable to suggest that income redistribution through 
income maintenance programs would have much less negative effect on 
savings, hence economic growth, in highly developed countries, such 
as the United States. The revenues needed to attain a certain level 
of equity (say that of Britain) would be a much smaller proportion 
of GNP in highly developed countries than in less developed countries.
The negative effect of the income maintenance programs on savings 
may be offset by their positive influence on the consumption demand.
It can be argued that income redistribution through income maintenance 
programs would stimulate long-run growth because consumption would 
increase and encourage investment in an otherwise stagnant economy. 
Lange (1938) proposed the concept of an "optimum propensity to consume" 
which extends Keynes’ normal model. He maintained that investment was 
a negative function of the interest rate but a positive function of 
consumption. Although investment behavior is much more complex than
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only these two determinants can suggest, their dominant influences on 
investment behavior are nontheless beyond dispute.
The previous section on the income maintenance programs' con­
sumption impact suggests that such an effect would be modest at the 
national level, but with significant regional variations, i.e., 
inducing higher increases in consumption in poor regions. These 
increases in consumption in the poor regions may or may not be at 
the expense of the rich regions, depending upon the ways the programs 
are financed. The Family Assistance Plan, for example, would increase 
the consumption expenditures in the poor regions of the United States, 
such as the South, at the expense of the consumption expenditures of 
the rich regions. But the net results would be a modest increase in 
consumption for the nation as a whole. Even though the total national 
consumption expenditures would not experience a drastic increase, the 
increased consumption expenditures in the poor regions may be big 
enough to stimulate growth in these regions through multiplier effect 
of such increase in consumption expenditures.^
An income maintenance program, such as the FAP, would benefit 
not only the low income groups, but also the middle and high income 
groups through its multiplier effect. An empirical study by Silvers 
(1970), designed to estimate the differential multiplier income 
impacts of public programs incident to specific income groups, has 
found that the distribution of indirect benefits to each income group 
is independent of the distribution of the direct benefits. His 
results show that 16 percent of all indirect impacts will be incident
^A good example of multiplier effect is provided by Bolton (1966)
120
to the low income group, approximately 53 percent will be incident to 
the middle income group, and about 31 percent will be incident to the 
high income group. The size of the aggregate multiplier, according 
to Silvers (1970), increases as the proportion of the direct income 
benefits going to the poor increases. Thus, the transfer income to 
the poor will benefit the entire community or region most before its 
multiplier effect runs out.
Although income maintenance programs may not have too much effect 
on aggregate consumption demand, they may have a greater effect on the 
composition of such demand. As the section on income maintenance 
programs' consumption impact suggested, the program-induced increases 
in consumption would mainly concentrate on basic consumer items, such 
as food, clothing, housing, and urban services, which are labor- 
intensive. Increased demand for these basic items in the poor regions 
may create significant economies of scale in the production of these 
items locally, thus not only reduce the leakage effect of these regions' 
imports (of these items) but also create employment opportunities within 
these regions through the establishment of import substitution industries. 
Such an initial exogenous influence provided by the income maintenance 
may provoke a series of iterative adjustments in consumer demand 
structure, factor use and income distribution. As Cline (1972) puts 
"if redistribution caused a shift in demand toward more labor-intensive 
goods, employment opportunities would rise and the resulting increment 
in labor earnings would equalize income distribution further; this 
further change would cause a demand shift toward labor-intensive goods 
again, and the process would become one of iteration with successive 
rounds having more equal income distribution and greater weight of
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labor-intensive goods in the production structure."
In the poor regions, there is usually the chronic problem of 
surplus labor, the program-induced shift in demand for more labor- 
intensive goods would considerably benefit workers in these regions 
from increased employment opportunities. But some caveats about 
the program-induced positive effects are needed. Firstly, the 
program's direct effects in the poor regions may be offset by its 
indirect effects since in the short-run most of those advantages 
mentioned before may not occur and the increased consumption in the 
poor regions may only benefit the more industrialized rich regions 
through the poor regions' increased demand for consumer items which 
are mainly produced by the rich regions. As confirmed by Golladay 
and Haveman (1977), two income maintenance proposals (FAP and NIT) 
would increase retail purchases in Southern states, but "a high 
proportion of the real production required by these purchases occurs 
outside the South." Secondly, most of the program-induced effects 
are of short-term nature while economic growth is a long-term 
process, there is a time lag before the short-term effects could 
show their influences on the long-term process. It would take time 
for the poor regions to establish their import-substitution industries 
and to realize economies of scale in the production of those formerly 
imported goods and services. Lastly, if income maintenance programs 
greatly improve the incomes of the people in the poor regions, their 
increased incomes may cause a shift in demand for more capital-intensive 
goods, such as consumer durables, since capital-intensive goods have 
higher income elasticities of demand than that of labor-intensive 
basic consumer goods. The consequence is that the more industrialized
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rich regions would benefit more from their increased exports of these 
durable goods to the poor regions. These program-induced benefits to 
the rich regions, however, may be a strong argument for the income 
maintenance programs because they will benefit both poor and rich 
regions.
Regional labor supply will affect regional economic growth 
through its effects on the price of labor utilized in the region.
If the supply of labor exceeds the demand for labor in a region, the 
price of labor will fall in that region. And, the price of labor will 
rise if the supply of labor is insufficient to meet the demand for 
labor within a region. An oversupplied labor market tends to sustain 
the low rates of wages and to maintain very high rates of unemployment 
and underemployment. These conditions are detrimental to economic 
growth of a region for the inefficient use of factor of production 
(in this case, the labor) and the lack of incentives on the part of 
entrepreneurs to mechanize and industrialize their activities or to 
develop more profitable and technologically more advanced industries 
of capital-intensive and labor-saving nature. An undersupplied 
labor market may have some negative effects on the local, or regional, 
economic growth in the short-run, but these very negative effects may 
result in many positive effects in the long-run. In the short-run, 
the undersupplied labor market will force the price of labor to rise 
to the point that regional products loose their comparative advantages 
due to higher costs resulting from soared labor costs. Also, the 
undersupplied labor market might utilize labor of inferior qualities, 
such as uneducated or less-educated workers, or workers with less- 
than-adequate skills, thus lowering the productivity or increasing
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the production costs due to additional training expenditures. In 
the long-run, however, the high labor costs or the shortage of 
qualified labor may force the entrepreneurs to mechanize and 
industrialize their activities, or to utilize capital-intensive means 
of production, thus changing the local or regional economic structure 
and improving its competitiveness with other localities or regions.
Even the utilization of inferior labor may benefit the local or regional 
economic growth in the long-run for the increased occupational mobility 
in the labor force and the increased training opportunities they receive 
from such upward movement within the occupational structure.
The effects of various income maintenance programs, including the 
FAP, on the supply of labor are mainly concentrated on the eligible 
married women with dependent children and the eligible married male 
family heads with low-paying jobs in the service or secondary sectors 
of the economy. In the United States, these groups of population are 
mainly located in the South, and the rural portion of the North Central 
region, and in the urban cores of rich and more developed regions, such 
as the Northeast, the West, and the highly industrialized portion of 
the North Central region. Due to a lack of reliable empirical evidence, 
we are not sure about the exact magnitude of the labor supply effect of 
income maintenance programs. We can reasonably assume, however, that 
these effects will be of modest magnitude at most, because many other 
important factors, such as wage rates, growth rates of labor force, 
unemployment rates, employment structure of the local or regional 
economy, and the interregional migration of labor, are also affecting 
the labor supply function. The modest labor supply effects of income 
maintenance will be felt more severely in the poor or depressed regions
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of the United States due to the higher concentration of potential 
recipients. Thus, many labor-intensive secondary or service industries, 
using low-paid and low-skilled labor, in these regions may be adversely 
affected due to the income-maintenance-induced decline in labor 
participation rates or the program-induced rise in labor costs. Of 
course, these negative effects might provide some incentives for local 
or regional entrepreneurs to introduce more modern capital-intensive 
and labor-saving equipment, thus changing and upgrading the local or 
regional economic structure.
The labor supply effects of income maintenance programs will be 
minor or insignificant in the rich and more developed regions due to 
their much smaller share of potential recipients and their already 
much higher wage rates in those sectors mostlikely to be affected by 
income maintenance programs.
Interregional migration of labor has long been drawing attention 
from economists and growth planners for its potential negative effects 
on the economic growth of the poor regions. This process is highly 
selective due to the prohibitive money costs as well as other costs, 
e.g., opportunity, information, social, and psychic costs, of migration. 
The migrants are usually characterized as young, educated, and skilled 
workers (Parr, 1966). Williamson (1965) points out "selective mi­
gration of this type obviously accentuates the tendency towards regional 
income divergence: labor participation rates, ceteris paribus, will 
tend to rise in the rich and fall in the poor regions." Precious 
human capital will tend to flow out of the less developed poor regions 
and into the more developed rich regions, thus "making regional 
resource endowment per capita all the more lopsided and geographic
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imbalances all the more severe." (Williamson, 1965). These negative 
effects are also called "backwash effects" (Myrdal, 1957), or 
"polarization effects" (Hirschman, 1958). Although these effects are 
considered to be most severe during early stages of economic development 
in the less developed countries, their severity is also felt quite 
strongly in the underdeveloped or depressed regions of the highly 
developed countries, such as the United States.
Income maintenance programs, such as the FAP, would reduce the 
flows of interregional migration of the poor, but might increase the 
migratory flows of the poor at the intraregional level, i.e., from 
rural to urban areas. The reduction in interregional migration will 
help the poor regions to retain their much needed human capital; and 
the increase in intraregional migration (from rural to urban) will 
serve to help rural workers move into more productive, more skilled, 
and higher-paying jobs in the urban areas, thus also increasing their 
occupational mobility. This program-induced rural to urban migration 
within the poor regions will equalize within-region personal income 
inequalities (which are much greater in the poor regions than in the 
rich regions) and help rural areas to mechanize their economic 
activities in the long-run.
In the rich regions, income maintenance programs, such as the 
FAP, would reinforce a reverse migration, i.e., from urban to rural 
areas, thus alleviating many urban problems, such as traffic congestion, 
housing inadequacies, and increasing costs and inefficiency in the 
provision of urban services in these areas. This urban-to-rural 
migration might help to develop and industrialize the rural areas 
in the rich regions. This positive effect of urban-to-rural migration
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Is part of "spread" effects (Myrdal, 1957) or "trickling-down" effects 
(Hirs chraan, 1958).
The effects of income-maintenance-induced changes in demographic 
characteristics on regional economic growth are more indirect and less 
clear at the present time, because of the lack of relevant reliable 
empirical evidence and their long-term nature. According to the very 
limited evidence suggested in a previous section, the effects of 
various income maintenance programs, including the FAP, on the fertility, 
formation and dissolution of families, family structure and stability 
are very mild or insignificant. Income maintenance programs* major 
effect on the demographic characteristics may be more adequately 
viewed in terms of their impact on the improvement of human capital.
If income maintenance programs do not increase significantly the 
fertility rates of recipients, the increased income from government 
transfers may be used to improve the quality of their lives, such as 
better housing, more balanced diet, or increased and better education, 
thus improving their human capital and potentialities. The economic 
growth of all regions, poor or rich, will benefit from this improved 
human capital in the form of better prepared workers and their higher 
productivity.^ Of course, the poor regions would benefit more from 
this improvement due to their lower level of education among the 
general population and their greater share of national income 
maintenance payments.
If income maintenance programs should have much greater effects
A study indicated that if malnutrition among members of the poverty 
population in the U.S. were eliminated, the present value increase of 
national product, conservatively estimated, would be between $14.4 and 
$50.3 billion (Popkin, 1972: 134).
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on demographic characteristics in general and on fertility in particu­
lar, their effects on regional economic growth would be greater. For 
example, the program-induced higher rate of fertility would increase 
the population growth and its associated demand for more public welfare 
and public services, such as education and medical câte. In the poor 
regions, this increased demand for welfare and public services would 
compete with other economic activities for limited public resources, 
thus having some negative effects on the regional economic growth 
rates. But the increased family stability induced by some income 
maintenance programs, such as the FAP, would have some positive effects 
on the labor performance, and hence indirectly on the economic growth. 
The program-induced increase in marriage rates among the young adults 
may have some positive effects on the consumption demand of specific 
nature, such as the demand for housing, durable goods, and private 
automobiles, which would have a large effect on the local or regional 
economy.
The above general treatment of the impacts of income maintenance 
programs, including the FAP, on regional economic growth has indicated 
that the poor regions would benefit more from these programs than 
would the rich ones. These benefits to the poor regions may or may not 
come at the expense of the rich regions. In many aspects, the rich 
regions would also benefit from these income maintenance programs. 
Therefore, we can reasonably suggest that income maintenance programs, 
such as the proposed FAP, would have some positive impact on the 
national economic growth in the long-run. The rich regions' economic 
loss through taxation for financing the programs may be compensated 
for by the program-induced benefits, such as the increased exports
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of consumer goods to the poor regions, and the reduced in-migration 
of the poor from the poor regions. Thus, many economists and policy­
makers may have overestimated the income maintenance programs’ 
opportunity costs to the national economic growth. The present writer 
believes that reducing regional gaps, such as regional inequality in 
personal incomes, should be considered as a major goal of national 
economic development planning and not as a by-product of national economic 
development. Seers (1970) and Higgins (1973) have placed the relation 
of income redistribution and national economic development in the right 
perspective. The efforts to redistribute income and to reduce regional 
gap are essential part of the basic development thrust.
Traditional approach to regional growth has adopted the concept of 
competitive growth which assumes that the national growth rate is given, 
and then a given increment of growth will be distributed among the 
regions of the system according to their characteristics (such as 
locational advantages and disadvantages, relative market potential, 
comparative costs). Thus, the growth of one region is always at the 
expense of another. Richardson (1973) points out the major weakness 
of this approach, i.e., "treating regions as spaceless subsets of the 
national economy." And the consequence is that "regional growth rates 
are regarded as being decomposed from the national growth rate, and 
the possibility of growth in any region having any propulsive impact 
on the national growth rate is ignored." (Richardson, 1973). He then 
suggested a "generative growth" approach which treats the national 
growth rate as the result of the growth rates of the individual regions. 
And growth within any part of the national economy must have a specific 
locational origin (locality or region). He believes that the growth
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performance of an individual region can be raised and may have an impact 
on the national growth rate without necessarily adversely affecting the 
growth rate of its adjacent regions.
The present writer believes that the income-maintenance-induced 
benefits for the poor regions will improve their economic performance 
in the long-run and contribute to a higher aggregate national growth 
rate. This belief is in line with the "generative growth" approach.
Income Inequality and Regional Economic Growth 
A much overlooked and yet essential issue of regional economic 
growth is the relationship between regional income inequality and 
regional economic growth. Traditional economists often assume an 
over-simplified one-way relationshi' , i.e., the extent of income 
inequality between or within regions is a function of national or 
regional economic development. Regional income inequality would 
increase in the early stages, culminate in the middle stages, and 
finally decrease in the later stages of economic development. Such 
assumption would not only ignore the impact of regional income inequali­
ty on national and regional economic development, but also lead to 
some questionable decisions in economic development planning.
Severe income inequalities between or within regions would exert 
serious strains on regional economic growth, especially in the poor 
regions, through their effects on consumption, labor supply, and mi­
gration (Figure 22).
Effects on Consumption
Severe income inequalities between or within regions would hold 
down or even reduce regional consumption, especially in the poor regions, 
if low-income families account for a large proportion of the total
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FIGURE 22
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME INEQUALITY AND 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
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regional population. This is attributed to the fact that high-income 
families tend to have lower marginal consumption propensities than 
that of low-income families. Low consumption rates and expenditures 
would affect regional economic growth through their negative effects 
on the aggregate demand for various consumer items. Thus, they would 
prevent these regions from benefiting from an increased demand for 
consumer items and their associated multiplier effects on income, 
consumption, and employment.
Low consumption rates and expenditures would prevent poor regions 
from developing their own indigenous industries, or import substitution 
industries, to produce various consumer goods, due to a lack of effective 
demand big enough to realize the scale economies in producing these goods 
locally.^ The poor regions would suffer not only from losses due to the 
leakage effects of importing these consumer items from the rich regions, 
but also from the loss of potential employment opportunities.
Effects on Labor Supply
Severe income inequalities between or within regions may or may not 
have much effect on the quantity of the regional labor supply. But it 
would have a greater effect on the quality of the labor supply within 
a region. Severe income inequality usually deprives the low-income 
families of adequate diet, housing, medical care, education, and recre­
ation, thus preventing them from becoming a better and more productive 
labor force. A lack of qualified labor force or a low rate of labor 
productivity would have some negative effects on the regional economic 
growth, especially in the poor regions where a high percentage of total
It has been noted that in general much of the consumer goods 
consumed in poor regions are often produced in the industrially more 
advanced rich regions.
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regional population can be placed in the low-income category.
The low-quality labor force would set in motion a vicious circle 
in the poor regions. The low-productivity labor force would prolong 
the low wage rates (usually at the subsistence level) and the under­
employment associated with such labor force, thus further sustaining, 
if not increasing, its low productivity problem.
Effects on Migration
Severe income inequalities between regions would prolong or even 
aggravate interregional migration of the poor. This migration of the 
poor would drain the poor regions much of their young and better- 
educated human capital, thus adversely affecting their economic growth 
prospects. The large influx of the poor into the rich regions, especial­
ly their urban cores, may not necessarily benefit the receiving regions. 
Often these poor in-migrants would create or intensify various financial, 
social, and environmental problems in the already much crowded urban 
centers of the rich regions. The over-populated depressed urban cores, 
or central cities, in the large and rich American metropolitan areas 
are well illustrative of these problems. These financial, social, and 
environmental strains on the large urban centers of the rich regions 
are often detrimental to their economic growth. Programs designed to 
solve these problems would compete with other economic activities for 
public resources, thus incurring opportunity costs to the rich regions 
at the expense of their economic growth.
Interregional migration of the poor would create or aggravate 
not only a shortage of qualified labor force in the poor regions, but 
also a surplus of relatively low-skilled labor force with very limited 
mobility, physical as well as occupational, in the central cities of
133
the rich regions. Such inefficiencies in the labor supply function 
would have much negative effects on the economic growth of both the 
rich and poor regions. And if the shortage of qualified labor force 
in the poor regions prevents outside entrepreneurs from moving into 
these regions, or induces local entrepreneurs to out-migrate to other 
regions, such consequences of the interregional migration would dis­
courage economic growth of the poor regions even more.
Thus, income maintenance programs aiming at eliminating or 
reducing severe income inequalities, such as the Family Assistance 




This study has estimated the regional patterns of benefits of 
an income maintenance program, the proposed Family Assistance Plan, 
and its potential impacts on the inter-and intra-state income 
inequalities, regional labor supply, regional consumption, regional 
demographic characteristics, inter-and intra-regional migration, 
and regional economic growth in the United States. At the first 
glance, the plan would benefit those more populous states than it 
would for other states. On a per capita basis, however, the higher 
levels of benefit would go to Southern and border states. States in 
the Deep South would benefit most from the plan on the per capita 
basis.
The political support for the plan both in the House of Repre­
sentatives and the Senate indicates a very significant inverse 
relationship between states' per capita program benefits and their 
political support for the plan in Congress. This inconsistency 
between political support and program benefits can not be easily 
explained. Two reasons have been suggested, namely, the lack of 
understanding of benefits by the electorate as a whole and their 
elected representatives' different motives in evaluating the benefits 
of the Family Assistance Plan.
The analysis of income inequalities in the United States reveals 
that the present welfare system has caused a slight increase in 
inequalities between states. At the intra-state level, it has the 
effect of slightly reducing inequalities in some states while slightly
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increasing or making no difference in other states. The proposed 
Family Assistance Plan and a version of it adjusted for cost-of-living 
differences between states would mildly reduce inequalities both at 
the inter-state and intra-state levels. Their effectiveness in re­
ducing within-state inequalities varies among states, with a strong 
inverse relationship between the Family Assistance Plan’s effectiveness 
in reducing inequalities and the degree of affluence of individual 
states.
The inclusion of geographical location, urban-rural character, 
and economic structure variables in the analysis of intra-state 
income inequalities indicates important relationships between the 
effectiveness of the Family Assistance Plan in reducing inequalities 
and these variables. The plan would be most effective in the 
Southern states, followed by states in the North Central, the West, 
and the Northeast in a descending order. There seems to be a high 
correlation between the geographical location variable and the 
affluence variable. In other words, the plan would be less effective 
in reducing inequalities in a state located in a more developed, 
hence more affluent region.
The relationship between the plan's effectiveness in reducing 
inequalities and individual states' proportions of total population 
residing in the urban areas is a strong inverse one, except for the 
measure of information statistic. The relationship between the plan's 
effectiveness in reducing inequalities and individual states' shares 
of total income derived from agriculture is a strong positive one.
All these results seem to support the hypothesis that income mainte­
nance programs are more effective and more desirable in the industri-
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ally less developed rural regions or areas.
The impact of income maintenance programs on the labor supply 
function is the most controversial issue confronting the Family 
Assistance Plan. Various studies of income maintenance programs, 
including the Family Assistance Plan, suggest that their effects 
on the labor supply will be mild or minor, depending on program 
specifications. These effects, however, will have different meanings 
for male and female workers and different magnitudes for various 
sectors and regions. Under income maintenance programs, including 
the FAP, the female labor force will experience a greater decline 
in the participation rates than the male labor force, except for 
those unskilled or low-skilled male workers in the secondary and 
service sectors.
The program-induced decline in labor supply will be concentrated 
in the underdeveloped rural regions and the depressed urban cores in 
the more developed regions due to the concentration of program 
recipients in these regions.
The income maintenance programs, including the FAP, will have 
minor effects on the national consumption expenditures. If the programs 
are financed through increased taxation, such as the Family Assistance 
Plan, the poor regions will experience an increase in consumer expendi­
tures at the expense of the rich regions. The income maintenance 
programs will have greater effects on the composition of consumption, 
especially in the poor regions. In these regions, the program-induced 
increase in consumption will be concentrated on the basic consumer 
items, such as food, clothing, shelter, and urban services.
Economic theories suggest that income maintenance programs will
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have some positive effects on the fertility rates of the recipients, 
because they make children less expensive to produce. Existing 
empirical evidence, however, indicates that these effects of various 
income maintenance programs are either very minor or insignificant.
Income maintenance programs’ impact on the formation, dissolution, 
and stability of families is less clear due to a lack of empirical 
evidence. But we could expect income maintenance programs, such as 
the FAP, to have some positive effects on the family formation and 
negative effects on the family dissolution, and hence some positive 
effects on the family stability. These effects would be felt most 
strongly in the underdeveloped rural regions and depressed urban cores.
The impacts of income maintenance programs, such as the FAP, on 
inter-regional migration of the poor are more complex than are 
understood. Income maintenance payments would facilitate the financing 
of the physical moving of the potential migrants and help reducing the 
opportunity costs and risks associated with such move. But the migration 
of the poor seeking better economic opportunities, such as job opportuni­
ties and higher wages, may be discouraged by the plans’, especially that 
of the FAP, higher marginal tax rates on outside incomes. Also dis­
couraged are those migrants seeking higher welfare benefits in other 
states or regions. Thus, under income maintenance programs, such as 
the FAP, we could expect a decline in inter-regional or inter-state 
migration of the poor.
At the intra-regional or intra-state level, income maintenance 
programs, such as the FAP, might increase the rural-to-urban migration 
of the poor in the poor regions to take advantage of the better social 
and cultural amenities available there, while the programs might induce
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or enhance a reverse migration, from urban to rural, in the rich regions 
due to the diseconomies of urban size experienced in these regions.
The income maintenance programs, such as the FAP, would affect 
regional economic growth or development directly through their effects 
on savings, consumption, imports, utilization of factors, and scale 
economies, and indirectly through their effects on labor supply, 
demographic characteristics, and regional migration of the poor. These 
programs would have some negative effects on savings. But the program- 
induced loss in savings may be compensated for by the program-induced 
increase in consumption. The programs would induce an increase in the 
consumption of basic consumer items, such as food, shelter, clothing, 
and urban services, in the poor rural regions and thus create scale 
economies in producing these items locally and job opportunities for 
the surplus labor force in these regions. These trends are of long­
term nature, while in the short-term more developed rich regions 
would benefit from this increase in the consumption of basic consumer 
items in the poor regions.
The income maintenance programs, such as the FAP, would have some 
negative effects on the labor supply of female and unskilled and low- 
skilled male workers in the underdeveloped rural regions or depressed 
urban cores. The decline in labor supply or an increase in wage rates 
in these regions might induce entrepreneurs to resort to more capital- 
intensive and labor-saving methods of production or mechanize and 
industrialize their activities, thus changing and improving the economic 
structure, hence economic potential, of these regions. The program- 
induced increase in family stability and improvement in the human 
capital would increase the productivity of the workers in the regions.
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poor or rich alike. Under the income maintenance programs, such as 
the FAP, the decline in inter-regional migration of the poor might 
help poor regions to retain much of their better educated and better 
trained young migrants while relieving rich regions of their problems 
of increasing congestion and strains on the urban resources due to 
constant and large influx of the poor from the poor regions.
The present study has focused mainly on the effectiveness of a 
national income maintenance program, the proposed Family Assistance 
Plan, in reducing inter-state as well as intra-state income ine­
qualities in the United States. The lack of adequate data and 
resources has limited the present study of the FAP's impacts on 
other economic and social behavior to a fairly general and theoreti­
cal nature. Empirical studies of these impacts, however, are essential 
to a sound evaluation of any income maintenance programs, existing or 
proposed. Because of the complexity and immense costs of these studies, 
they should be carried out by a group or groups of an interdisciplinary 
nature and with adequate funding. The theoretical inferences of the 
present study can serve to provide some plausible hypotheses for 
future studies of income maintenance programs, especially those of 
the United States.
Since 1965, many income maintenance programs have been established 
explicitly or implicitly as a part of the ’war on poverty* in the 1960s. 
Although many of these programs explicitly designed to reduce income 
poverty proved to be rather ineffective, some of the unanticipated and 
unplanned effects of other programs helped to increase the economic 
welfare of those belonging to the low income groups (Haveman, 1977: 3). 
The net result was a considerable reduction in poverty over the decade.
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But this reduction in poverty during the decade is difficult to attribute 
to the direct effects of the programs that were an explicit part of the 
'war on poverty.' While all these programs helped to reduce the 
absolute poverty gap, serious income inequality still remains and may 
even become greater in the future between different socio-economic 
groups (Haveman, 1977). Thus, in the next decade, the welfare concern 
of the policy-makers and the general public will be shifted from the 
absolute income poverty to the relative income inequalities between 
regions and between various socio-economic groups. The effectiveness 
of the welfare system in eliminating or reducing income inequalities 
between regions and between population groups of various definitions 
will attract more public attention. The estimates of the present study 
with respect to the effectiveness of the Family Assistance Plan in 
reducing inter-state and intra-state income inequalities will provide 
policy-makers and the general public with some of the needed information 
for their decisions on the welfare reform of this nature. The measures 
of income inequality utilized in the present study will provide relevant 
tools for evaluating the effectiveness of various income maintenance 
programs in reducing income inequalities between various socio-economic 
groups of the population and between regions.
The present study has made a comparative analysis of the potential 
impacts of various present and proposed income maintenance programs.
The results of the present study, empirical or theoretical, seem to 
support the notion that a uniform national income maintenance program, 
if designed properly, is the solution to the present welfare dilemma.
In addition to the tremendous savings in the program costs and the 
administrative costs, a uniform national income maintenance program
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would eliminate or reduce much of the major problems confronting 
the present welfare system.
As suggested by Haveman (1977), the major goal of the social 
policy for the next decade may veiry well be that of checking and 
reducing the increasing income inequalities between various demographic 
groups. The present study indicates that a uniform national income mainte­
nance program, such as the Family Assistance Plan, would reduce income 
inequalities both between and within states in the United States. Al­
though these reductions in income inequality caused by the FAP are less 
impressive, they reflect the inadequacy of the plan's design, not the 
validity and utility of the income maintenance concept. The raising of 
the minimum program benefit levels and the relaxation of some of the 
program restrictions concerning eligibility requirements may render 
the income maintenance benefits to many hitherto ineligible families 
and individuals in the low and middle income brackets. This extension 
of income maintenance benefits to more low and middle income families 
and individuals would greatly improve the program's effectiveness and 
efficiency in eliminating the absolute poverty and in reducing the 
relative income inequalities among various demographic groups and 
among regions.
A major obstacle to the implementation of such a uniform national 
income maintenance program is the belief that any redistribution of 
income through income maintenance programs is detrimental to economic 
growth or development for their alleged negative impacts on the 
recipients and on the growth process. The present study contends that 
this need not be the case. Many positive effects of an income mainte­
nance program may in the long-run outweigh its negative effects. The
142
total net effect of such a program may be a positive one for both the 
rich and poor regions.^
A critical réévaluation of the present welfare system has long been 
overdue. Many incremental welfare reforms have been attempted by various 
governmental agencies, but with little remedial effects on the entire 
welfare system. The time has come for a comprehensive and inter­
disciplinary study of the feasibility, effectiveness, efficiency, and 
possible impacts of a national income maintenance program. Since this 
program may be our only solution to the present welfare mess, the 
responsibility for carrying out such a study clearly lies with the 
federal government for the essential study financing, coordination, and 
administration.
Of course, future studies of the impacts of various welfare reform 
programs should go beyond the scope of income inequality analysis and 
should include their economic, political, and social implications. The 
study of the economic impacts of welfare reform programs requires a 
comprehensive analytical model capable of estimating their first, second, 
. . , and final rounds of impacts, direct as well as indirect ones. Al­
though such a model is yet to appear, the work and contribution of 
researchers and practitioners in various disciplines have made this 
task less formidable. The political and social impacts of welfare reform 
programs would be complex and difficult to measure, thus requiring both 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of such impacts.
Also, the study of welfare reform programs should go beyond the
Income redistribution through income maintenance should be treated 
only as a supplementary stimulus to regional economic growth. Other 
economic stimulation schemes, such as the establishment of industries or 
economic bases with high income and employment multiplier effects, are 
more important and effective in stimulating regional economic growth.
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impact-analysis stage and be more normative and prescriptive than is 
the case at present. Thus, welfare reform studies would provide 
policy-makers with not only the information about the potential impacts 
of various welfare reform programs, but also the optimal formats and 
contents of these programs in accordance with relevant policy goals 
and program criteria.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abler, R.; Adams, J.; and Gould, P. Spatial Organization. Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, 1971.
Albin, P. S. "Poverty, Education, and Unbalanced Economic Growth," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (1970), 70-8,4.
Alker, Hayward R., Jr. Mathematics and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 
1965.
Barth, M. C.; Carcagno, G. J.; and Palmer, J. L. Toward an Effective 
Income Support System: Problems, Prospects, and Choices. Madison, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on 
Poverty, 1974.
Baumol, William J. "An Overview of the Results on Consumption,
Health, and Social Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, 9 
(Spring, 1974), 253-264.
Bawden, D. Lee; Cain, Glen G.; and Hausman, Leonard J. "The Family 
Assistance Plan: An Analysis and Evaluation," Public Policy,
19 (Spring, 1971), 323-353.
Bernstein, Blanche and Meezan, William. "The Impact of Welfare on 
Family Stability," Center for New York City Affairs, New School 
for Social Research, June 1975.
Bolton, Roger E. Defense Purchases and Regional Growth. Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966.
Bonner, Ernest. "The Effects of a National Income Maintenance Program 
on the Level and Industrial Composition of Economic Activity in 
Metropolitan Areas," in Larry Orr, Robinson Hollister, and Myron 
Lefcowitz (eds.). Income Maintenance. Chicago: Markham, 1971a, 
172-177.
Bonner, Ernest. "The Influence of a National Income Maintenance 
Program on Migration of the Poor," in Larry Orr, Robinson 
Hollister, and Myron Lefcowitz (eds.). Income Maintenance. 
Chicago: Markham, 1971b, 155-171.
Bowles, Samuel. "Migration as Investment: Empirical Tests of the 
Human Investment Approach to Geographical Mobility," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 52 (November, 1970), 356-362.
Browning, Edgar K. Redistribution and the Welfare System. Washington, 




Burns, Eveline M. Social Security and Public Policy. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1956.
Cain, Glen G. "Experimental Income Maintenance Programs to Assess 
the Effect on Fertility," in Larry Orr, Robinson Hollister, 
and Myron Lefcowitz (eds.), Income Maintenance. Chicago:
Markham, 1971, 126-137.
Cain, Glen G. "The Effect of Income Maintenance Laws on Fertility in
the United States," Discussion Paper 117-72, Institute for Research 
on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, April 1972.
Cherlin, Andrew. "No Long Delay Needed: We Have Tried Welfare Reform, 
and It Works," The New Republic, 177 (December 17, 1977), 13-15.
Chiswick, B. R. "Earnings Inequality and Economic Development,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (1971), 21-39.
Cline, William R. Potential Effects of Income Redistribution on 
Economic Growth: Latin American Cases. New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1972.
Commerce Clearing House. Congressional Index 92nd Congress, 1971-1972. 
New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1971-1972, 5284 and 5545.
Congressional Quarterly. "Guaranteed Income," Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac. 23 (1967), 993-995.
Congressional Quarterly. "Family Assistance," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report, 28 (November 27, 1970), 2852.
Congressional Quarterly. "Welfare: Income Floor of $2,400 Proposed 
to House," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 29 (June 4,
1971a), 1199, 1201, and 1203-1205.
Congressional Quarterly. "House Passes Nixon-Backed Welfare Reform
Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 29 (June 25, 1971b), 
1367-1369.
Congressional Quarterly. "Welfare Reform," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report. 30 (May 6, 1972a), 1016.
Congressional Quarterly. "Senate Rejects Ribicoff, Nixon Welfare
Reform Plans," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 30 (October 7, 
1972b), 2628-2629.
Cutright, Phillips. "Economic Events and Illegitimacy in Developed 
Countries," Journal of Comparative Family Studies. 2 (Spring,
1971), 33-53.
Cutright, Phillips. "Illegitimacy and Income Supplements," in Sub­
committee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee of 
the Congress, Studies in Public Welfare, paper No. 12, Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1973.
146
DaVanzo, Julie. An Analytical Framework for Studying the Potential 
Effects of An Income Maintenance Program on U.S. Interregional 
Migration. R-1081-EDA. Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation, December 1972.
DaVanzo, Julie. Assessing the Potential Impact of An Income Maintenance 
Program on Migration: Hypotheses and Suggestions for Research. P- 
5006. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, May 1973.
DaVanzo, Julie and Greenberg, David H. Assessing Regional Effects of 
Income Maintenance Programs: A Guide to Policy Analysis. P-5254. 
Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, June 1974.
De Tray, Dennis N. A Conceptual Basis for the Study of Welfare Reform 
Effects. R-1066-DOC. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 
September 1972.
Durbin, Elizabeth F. "The Effect of Welfare Programs on the Decision 
to Work," New York University Graduate School of Business 
Administration, August 1968.
Fechter, Alan and Greenfield, Stuart. "Welfare and Illegitimacy: An 
Economic Model and Some Preliminary Results," Urban Institute 
Working Paper, Washington, D.C., August 1973.
Friedman, Milton. A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957.
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962.
Galenson, W. and Leibenstein, H. "Investment Criteria, Productivity, 
and Economic Development," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69 
(August, 1955), 343-370.
Gest, Kathryn Waters. "Carter, Congress and Welfare: A Long Road," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 35 (August 13, 1977a), 
1699-1706.
Gest, Kathryn Waters. "Welfare Reform: Moving Along, But Slowly," 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 35 (December 24, 1977b), 
2658-2661.
Giantz, Frederic B. The Determinants of the Interregional Migration of 
the Economically Disadvantaged. Research Report No. 52. Boston: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, January 1973.
Golladay, Fredrick L. and Haveman, Robert H. The Economic Impacts 
of Tax-Transfer Policy: Regional and Distributional Effects.
New York: Academic Press, 1977.
Gordon, David M. "Income and Welfare in New York City," The Public 
Interest. 16 (Summer, 1969), 64-88.
147
Greenberg, David H. Income Guarantees and the Working Poor in New 
York City: the Effect of Income Maintenance Programs on the 
Hours of Work of Male Family Heads. R-658-NYC. Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation, March 1971.
Greenberg, David H. and Hosek, James R. Regional Labor Supply
Response to Negative Income Tax Programs. R-1785-EDA. Santa 
Monica, California: Rand Corporation, February 1976.
Greenberg, David H. and Rosters, Marvin. The Impact of Income Mainte­
nance Programs on Hours of Work and Incomes of the Working Poor:
Some Empirical Results. P-4544. Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation, December 1970a.
Greenberg, David H. and Rosters, Marvin. Income Guarantees and the 
Working Poor: the Effect of Income Maintenance Programs on the 
Hours of Work of Male Family Heads.R-579-OEO. Santa Monica, 
California: Rand Corporation, December 1970b.
Greenwood, Michael J. "Research on Internal Migration in the United
States: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, 13 (June, 1975), 
397-433.
Hansen, Niles M. Location Preferences, Migration, and Regional Growth:
A Study of the South and Southwest United States. New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973.
Hausman, L.J. and Rasper, H. "The Work Effort Response of Women to 
Income Maintenance," in Larry Orr, Robinson Hollister, and Myron 
Lefcowitz (eds.). Income Maintenance. Chicago: Markham, 1971,
89-104.
Haveman, Robert H. Economic Effects of Tax-Transfer Policy; The 
Potentials and Problems of Microdata Simulations. Discussion 
Paper No. 366-76. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 
Institute for Research on Poverty, August 1976.
Haveman, Robert H. "Poverty, Income Distribution, and Social Policy:
The Last Decade and the Next," Public Policy, 25 (Winter, 1977), 
3-24.
Heclo, Hugh. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From 
Relief to Income Maintenance. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974.
Heidenheimer, Arnold J.; Heclo, Hugh; and Adams, Carolyn T. Comparative 
Public Policy: The Politics of Social Choice in Europe and America. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.
Higgins, Benjamin. "Trade-Off Curves and Regional Gaps," in J. Bhagwati 
and R. S. Eckaus (eds.). Development and Planning. Cambridge, Mass: 
M.I.T. Press, 1973, 152-177.
148
Hirschman, Albert 0. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1958.
Hodge, David C. and Lee, Russell M. "Comments on Measuring Temporal 
Trends in Regional Income Inequalities," Geographical Analysis,
8 (July, 1976), 329-331.
Honig, Marjorie. "The Impact of Welfare Payment Levels on Family
Stability," in Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the Congress, Studies on Public Welfare, Paper No. 12, 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, Part I, 37-53.
Houthakker, H. S. "An International Comparison of Personal Savings," 
Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique, 38 (1961), 
55-69.
Hutchens, Robert M. Changes in AFDC Tax Rates, 1967-1971. Discussion 
Paper No. 352-76. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 
Institute for Research on Poverty, July 1976.
Johnston, R. J. "Political Geography and Welfare: Observations on
Interstate Variations in Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Programs," Professional Geographer, 29 (November, 1977), 347-352.
Juster, F. Thomas, ed. The Economic and Political Impact of General
Revenue Sharing. NSF-RA-76-0040. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, April 1976.
Kahn, Alfred J. "Social Security as System," in Shirley Jenkins (ed.). 
Social Security in International Perspective. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969, 211-227.
Kain, John F. and Schafer, Robert. Regional Impacts of the Family
Assistance Plan: Some Revised Estimates. Discussion Paper No. 69. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, Program on Regional and 
Urban Economics, December 1971.
Kottis, Athena P. "Effects of Income Maintenance on the Economies 
of Communities: A Theoretical Exploration," Urban Affairs 
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1973), 465-487.
Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American 
Economic Review, 45 (March, 1955), 1-28.
Lange, Oskar. "The Rate of Interest and the Optimum Propensity to 
Consume," Economica, 5 (February, 1938), 12-32.
Lankford, Philip M. Regional Incomes in the United States, 1929-1967: 
Level, Distribution, Stability, and Growth. Research Paper No. 145. 
Chicago; University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1972.
Lewis, W. Arthur. "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labor," The Manchester School, 22 (May, 1954), 139-191.
149
Lloyd, Cynthia B. "The Effect of Child Subsidies on Fertility: An 
International Study," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1972.
Lloyd, Cynthia B. "An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Government 
on Fertility," Public Policy, 22 (Fall, 1974), 489-512.
Lurie, Irene, ed. Integrating Income Maintenance Programs. New York: 
Academic Press, 1975.
Macarov, David. Incentives to Work. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970.
MacDonald, Maurice and Sawhill, Isabel V. "Welfare Policy and the 
Family," Public Policy, 26 (Winter, 1978), 89-119.
Mayo, Stephen K. "The Household Composition Effects of Income Transfer 
Programs," Public Policy, 24 (Summer, 1976), 395-422.
Miller, Herman P. Rich Man, Poor Man. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1971.
Modigliani, Franco and Brumberg, Richard. "Utility Analysis and 
the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross Section 
Data," in K. K. Kurihara (ed.), Post-Keynesian Economics. New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 383-436.
Moeller, J. F. "Household Budget Responses to Negative Tax Simulations." 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1970.
Morrill, Richard L. and Wohlenberg, Ernest H. The Geography of 
Poverty in the United States. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
Moynihan, Daniel P. The Politics of A Guaranteed Income. New York:
Random House, 1973.
Myrdal, Gunnar. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London:
1957.
Neenan, William B. The Distributional Impact of the State and Local 
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. Discussion Paper No. 305-75.
Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research 
on Poverty, March 1976.
Nixon, Richard M. Nationwide Radio and Television Address, August 8, 
1969, in Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of A Guaranteed 
Income. New York: Random House, 1973, 220-226.
O'Neill, June A. "The Effect of Income and Education on Inter-regional 
Migration." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970.
Orr, Larry L. "Introduction: Strategy for a Broad Program of
Experimentation in Income Maintenance," in Larry Orr, Robinson 
Hollister, and Myron Lefcowitz (eds.). Income Maintenance.
Chicago: Markham, 1971, 47-70.
150
Orr, Larry L. "Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application 
to AFDC," American Economic Review, 66 (June, 1976), 359-371.
Ozawa, Martha N. "Social Insurance and Redistribution," in Alvin L.
Schorr (ed.). Jubilee for Our Times. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977, 123-177.
Parr, John B. "Outmigration and the Depressed Area Problem," Land 
Economics, 42 (1966), 149-159.
Peterson, George E. "Welfare, Workfare, and Pareto Optimality,"
Public Finance Quarterly, 1 (July, 1973), 323-338.
Popkin, Barry M. "Economic Benefits from the Elimination of Hunger in 
America," Public Policy, 20 (Winter, 1972), 133-153.
President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs. Poverty Amid
Plenty: The American Paradox. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, November 1959.
Richardson, Harry W. Regional Growth Theory. London: Macmillan, 1973.
Roseman, Curtis C. Changing Migration Patterns within the United 
States. Resource Papers for College Geography, No. 77-2.
Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1977.
Ross, Heather and Sawhill, Isabel. Time of Transition: The Growth 
of Families Headed by Women. Washington, D.C.: The Urban 
Institute, 1975.
Schorr, Alvin L. "Welfare Reform and Social Insurance," Public Welfare, 
36 (Winter, 1978), 49-55.
Schultz, T. Paul. Estimating the Regional Impact of Federal Income 
Maintenance Programs. P-4818. Santa Monica, California: Rand 
Corporation, May 1972.
Schultz, T. Paul. Estimating Labor Supply Functions for Married Women. 
R-1265-NIH/EDA. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation,
February 1975.
Schwartz, Aba. "Migration and Life Span Earnings in the U.S." Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Chicago, 1968.
Schwind, Paul J. Migration and Regional Development in the United
States, 1950-1960. Research Paper No. 133. Chicago: University 
of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1971.
Seers, Dudley, "Income Distribution and Employment," Bulletin,
Institute for Development Studies (Sussex), 2 (July, 1970).
151
Sample, R. K. and Griffin, J. M. An Information Analysis of Trends 
in Urban Growth Inequality in Canada. Discussion Paper No. 19. 
Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Department of Geography, 
April 1971.
Semple R. K. and Gauthier, H. L. "Spatial-Temporal Trends in Income 
Inequalities in Brazil," Geographical Analysis. 4 (April, 1972), 
169-179.
Silvers, Arthur L. "The Structure of Community Income Circulation in 
an Incidence Multiplier for Developmental Planning," Journal of 
Regional Science, 10 (1970), 175-189.
Silvers, Arthur L. "Probabilistic Income-Maximizing Behavior in 
Regional Migration," International Regional Science Review,
2 (Fall, 1977), 29-40.
Simon, Julian. "The Effect of Foster-care Payment Levels Upon the 
Number of Foster Children Given Homes," unpublished paper.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1972.
Simon, J. L. and Simon, R. J. "The Effect of Money Incentives on 
Family Size: A Hypothetical-Question Study," unpublished 
paper. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1972.
Sjaastad, Larry A. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration,"
Journal of Political Economy.70 (October, 1962), Part 2, 80-93.
Smith, David M. The Geography of Social Well-being in the United 
States. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.
Sweet, James A. "Some Demographic Aspects of Income Maintenance Policy," 
in Larry Orr, Robinson Hollister, and Myron Lefcowitz (eds.).
Income Maintenance. Chicago: Markham, 1971, 111-125.
Theobald, Robert. Free Men and Free Markets. Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, 1965.
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. "State and Regional Personal Income, 
1958-73," Survey of Current Business, 54 (August, 1974), 28-43.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Three Budgets for an Urban Family of 
Four Persons, 1969-70. Bulletin 1570-5, Supplement. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population: 1970. GENERAL SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, Final Report PC(1)--C2-C9, C11-C52. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971-1972.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1972. Washington, 
D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973,
152
U.S. Congress. House. Ways and Means Committee. Social Security 
Amendments of 1971. House Report No. 92-231, 92d Congress, 1st 
Session, 1971.
Vaughan, Roger J, The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies; Vol. 2, 
Economic Development. R-2028-KF/RC. Santa Monica, California: 
Rand Corporation, June 1977.
Wilbanks, Thomas J. and Huang, Hsiung. "The Regional Impact of the 
Proposed Family Assistance Plan," Proceedings of the Association 
of American Geographers, 7 (1975), 283-288.
Williamson, J. G. "Regional Inequality and the Process of National
Development: a Description of the Patterns," Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 13 (1965), 3-45.
Wohlenberg, Ernest H. "Interstate Variations in AFDC Programs," 
Economic Geography,52 (July, 1976a), 254-266.
Wohlenberg, Ernest H. "Public Assistance Effectiveness by States,"
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 66 (September, 
1976b), 440-450.
Wohlenberg, Ernest H. "An Index of Eligibility Standards for Welfare 
Benefits," Professional Geographer, 28 (November, 1976c), 381-384.
Worthington, Mark D. and Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. "Incremental Welfare 
Reform: A Strategy Whose Time Has Passed," Public Policy, 25 
(Winter, 1977), 49-80.
